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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three studies. The topics discussed are in the area of international 
trade and economic growth with a reference to the policy issues in East Asia. 
The study in Chapter 2 presents a model of North-South trade which can explain the ob- 
served cross-country variations in factor prices. Intuition and evidence suggest that knowledge 
is largely non-excludable and hence all countries should have access to broadly similar technol- 
ogy. However, this public-good assumption for technology leads to implausible predictions of 
factor prices in standard models. The model in this study does not assume any differences in 
technology but its predictions are consistent with observations. 
In Chapter 3, the implications of the two vintage models for growth accounting are ex- 
amined. Growth accounting studies have shown that total factor productivity growth in East 
Asian economies has been slower than expected. Analysis of the vintages models suggests that 
this puzzling finding could be due to mismeasurements of capital arising from the particular 
characteristic of East Asian growth experience. 
In Chapter 4, it is shown that when asymmetric economies adopt an open regionalism policy, 
some of them may gain at the expense of others. This result is very different from the commonly 
held view in the literature. In certain situations, some economies in the bloc achieves a higher 
welfare level than under global free trade. A policy of open regionalism could therefore turn 
out to be an obstacle to the process of multilateral trade liberalization. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 An overview 
This thesis consists of three studies in the area of international trade and economic growth with 
a particular reference to the policy issue in East Asia. 
The observed cross-country variations in per capita income and factor prices cannot be 
explained easily without assuming that the technological levels are vastly different between the 
rich and poor countries. However, given the non-excludable nature of knowledge, assuming large 
differences in the technological level is hard to justify. ' What is necessary therefore is a model 
which can account for the observed cross-country variations without introducing differences 
in technology. In Chapter 2, I will present a variant of the AK model and argue that the 
predictions of the model are consistent with the available evidence. The results rely on two 
key elements of the model. First, the capital goods sector has the structure of the AK model. 
Second, specialisation takes place as a result of North-South trade. 
The study in Chapter 3 provides an explanation for the modest total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth in East Asia. I will argue that this puzzling finding in the growth accounting 
studies for East Asia is largely due to mismeasurements of capital. It is shown that if the 
mechanisms described by the vintage models are at work, then TFP residuals for East Asian 
economies are likely to understate the real extent of technological progress for two reasons. 
'As I will discuss later, this is a very controversial area. 
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First, the vintage model of Solow (1959) imply that if capital inputs are measured in real 
terms, TFP residuals are likely to understate the actual extent of technological progress. More- 
over, the problem of understatement would be worse in capital goods importing economies such 
as those of East Asia. Hence the TFP growth rates of East Asian economies may appear to 
be modest when compared with the industrialised economies. It is likely that the actual rate 
of technological progress has been higher than the findings in recent growth accounting studies 
suggest. Second, in the "fixed-proportions" vintage model, the substitution possibilities be- 
tween labour and capital are limited. In this case, the retirement rate of the existing capital 
stock is endogenously determined. When rapid accumulation of capital takes place, a larger 
proportion of the existing capital stock is made obsolete. This means that estimates of the 
capital stock obtained by assuming a constant rate of capital depreciation tend to overstate 
the growth of capital when the rate of investment is high. Overstating the growth of capital, 
in turn, reduces TFP residuals. This model can therefore account for the observed negative 
correlation between measured TFP growth and the rate of capital accumulation. 
In Chapter 4, potential problems associated with the policy of open regionalism are dis- 
cussed. In the post-war years, the success of the negotiations at the GATT has resulted in 
increasing worldwide openness to trade. However, a growing number of regional trade blocs 
have been formed in recent years, raising the concerns that the emergence of regionalism may 
slow down the process of multilateral trade liberalization. In response to such criticism, propo- 
nents of regional trade blocs have suggested the idea of "open regionalism" at the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC). In the theoretical literature, the term "open regionalism" refers 
to a number of different nondiscriminatory trading arrangements. This study focuses on the 
policy known as unconditional MFN, under which a trade bloc unconditionally extends the 
trade liberalization measures agreed among the member countries to non-members on an MFN 
basis. It is shown that if asymmetric countries form a trade bloc and adopt this form of open 
regionalism, some economies in the bloc may gain at the expense of the others. Moreover, the 
policy of open regionalism could turn out to be an obstacle to the process of multilateral trade 
liberalization. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will briefly discuss the background of the issues examined 
in this thesis. 
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1.2 Accounting for the cross-country variations in per capita 
income and factor prices 
The aim of the study in Chapter 2 is to provide an explanation for North-South inequality in 
per capita income and wages. I will first discuss why the explanations that rely on differences 
in the technological level are not convincing. An important aspect of the model in Chapter 2 
is trade in capital goods. I will briefly discuss the literature of trade in capital goods in this 
section also. 
A useful point to start the examination of the issue is to consider the following simple 
production function; 
y=Ax', (1.1) 
where y is income per worker and x is (broadly defined) capital per worker. In this framework, 
it is evident that differences in output per worker can be attributed to either differences in the 
levels of technology, represented by the parameter A in this model, or differences in capital 
per worker. 2 In standard growth models, a higher level of technology leads to a higher steady 
state level of capital per worker. Hence, when we discuss what contributes to the cross-country 
variations in per capita income in this framework, the question is whether capital per worker 
alone can explain the cross-country variations or differences in technology also play a role. 
Let w denote the wage rate. We assume throughout this study that the labour market is 
competitive and the wage rate is given by the marginal product of labour. With the Cobb- 
Douglas production function as in (1.1), the wage rate is therefore given by w= (1 - eo)Axa. 
It is clear that the issue of the cross-country variations in the wage rate is essentially the same 
as that of per capita income. 
In the literature, there are two opposing views on the availability of technology in low-income 
countries. One takes the view that international knowledge transfers should be relatively easy 
while the other maintains that there are large differences in technologies available to the rich 
and poor countries. 3 
2Although quantities are clearly different when measured in "per capita" and "per worker" but they can be 
treated as equivalent for the purpose of discussion in this thesis. 
3Clearly, the controversy is over the degree of availability. Even those who regard technology as largely non- 
excludable do not suggest that the exactly the same sets of technology are available to all firms in all countries. 
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Intuition and evidence suggest that differences in the technological level are unlikely to be 
large enough to explain the vast North-South inequality. If less developed countries were poor 
because of their technology, there would be a huge incentive to adopt better technology from 
richer countries. Given that large returns could be expected from adopting better technology, 
one would have to ask why differences in the technological level should persist. Most scientific 
formulae and other accumulated knowledge applicable to production are available in print and 
other forms of media and hence accessible in most countries. Therefore technology seems to be 
non-excludable to a large extent, in which case there should be relatively small differences in 
the availability of technology anywhere in the world. 
There is some evidence to confirm that much of technology is non-excludable. Olson (1996) 
notes that according to a study for Korea for the period from 1973 to 1979 (Koo, 1982), 
"royalties and all other payments for disembodied technology were minuscule". Suppose that 
the Korean firms had had much inferior technology without these licensing agreements and 
that the licensing agreements allowed the Korean firms to raise their productivity significantly. 
Then such gains would have been reflected in the value of these license agreements, provided 
that the market for licenses was competitive. A small value of royalties implies that the gains 
in terms of productivity from these licensing agreements were relatively small. Therefore it 
suggests that access to technology was less of a problem for Korean firms. ` 
The quantitative aspect of the issue is also worth noting. Mankiw (1995) comments that "If 
technological change enhances productivity by 2 percent per year, and if rich countries are five 
times as productive as poor countries, then poor countries must be using a production function 
that is about eighty years out of date. " It is implausible that low-income countries do not have 
access to technologies which have become so out of date in industrialised economies. It is quite 
likely that there are difficulties in transferring state-of-the-art technologies to less developed 
countries. ' However, the scale of North-South inequality is such that it cannot be explained by 
the fact that poorer countries do not possess the most modern technologies. 
Neither does the other side of the debate argue that no international transfers of knowledge take place. The 
question is whether differences in technology are responsible for a significant part of North-South inequality. 
'Note, however, that the actual compensation for the transferred technologies could have been paid through 
so-called transfer pricing. 
5For a recent study on transfers of state-of-the-art technologies, see, for example, Glass and Saggi (1998). 
Teece (1976) shows that the costs of technology transfer by multinational corporations decline with the age of 
technology being transferred. 
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Absorptive capacity, institutions and economic policies 
Sometimes a distinction is made between access to technology and absorptive capacity. The 
idea is that although knowledge about technologies may be freely available, that in itself is not 
enough to apply these technologies to industrial use efficiently. In order to make use of the 
available technologies, the economy needs to have workers with appropriate skills or human 
capital. Moreover, firms need to make efforts to adopt technologies to suit their particular 
circumstances. 6 
This approach contrasts with the neoclassical model which assumes that all factor markets 
are able to respond efficiently to the given prices and that firms possess the capabilities to 
adopt advanced technologies. Lall (1990), for example, argues that the "acquisition of industrial 
capabilities is not an easy, automatic or costless process. " Furthermore, it cannot be assumed 
that "firms start by operating on a production function where such capabilities are already fully 
formed". 
Introducing the idea of limited absorptive capacity would apparently reconcile the fact that 
knowledge is non-excludable with the argument that the total factor productivity in poorer 
countries is much lower. However, a closer examination reveals that there are difficulties in 
using the idea of absorptive capacity to explain North-South inequality in a general equilibrium 
framework. 
In fact, the concept of absorptive capacity has equivalents in endogenous growth literature. 
First, consider the idea that human capital is needed to adopt more advanced technologies. 
This argument amounts to saying that the economy needs to allocate some of its human capital 
to activities which are aimed at raising the economy's productivity. If we express this idea in a 
formal model, it is analogous to models of innovation such as Romer (1990) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991, Ch. 7). 7 I will discuss later why these endogenous growth models do not provide 
a satisfactory explanation for North-South inequality in more detail. The essential idea is simple. 
As Olson (1996) notes, the argument based on the scarcity of human capital "overlooks the fact 
that the rewards to those missing skills, when other things are equal, would then be higher in 
the poor societies than in societies in which these skills were relatively plentiful. " It is evident 
6For an overview, see Evenson and Westphal (1995). 
7See also Keller (1995) which explicitly refers to absorptive capacity. 
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that this is not the case. As the flow of immigration demonstrates, the skilled wage is higher 
in the rich countries. 
If technology were the cause of North-South inequality, there would be a huge incentive to 
adopt better technology. The idea of limited absorptive capacity is meant to solve this apparent 
puzzle. However, if lack of skilled workers were the problem, then a much higher wage rate 
should be offered to skilled workers contrary to the observed fact. Hence the puzzle remains. 
One answer to this criticism is the possibility of a market failure. Lall (1990) comments 
that "individuals tend (due to externalities, risk-aversion and inadequate foresight) to under- 
invest in their own education". Given that we are trying to explain the low skilled wage 
(despite its scarcity) in poorer countries, the issue is not market failures in financing human 
capital investment. Hence, risk-aversion and inadequate foresight are not very relevant to 
this discussion. In this context, if there is a market failure, it means that skilled workers are 
underpaid. Although externality is a possibility, it is hard to grasp how positive externalities 
from human capital arises. I will discuss this point later in this chapter. 
The second approach to absorptive capacity emphasises the need for expending resources 
to acquire modern technologies. 8 This argument is also unsatisfactory for a similar reason. If 
investment is needed to adopt modern technologies, such investment should yield very high 
returns, which apparently is not the case. In response, it could be argued that the activity to 
adopt modern technology has a low productivity level. However, an obvious question follows; 
why should the productivity of adopting modern technologies be so low? Thus, if we are to 
analyse the concept of absorptive capacity in a general equilibrium framework, it is difficult to 
point to what the obstacles to adopting freely available technologies are. 
Olson (1996) stresses the importance of economies' institutions and economic policies which 
have large influence on the structure of incentives. It is argued that the "intricate social 
cooperation that emerges when there is a sophisticated array of markets requires far better 
institutions and economic policies than most countries have. " This line of argument could help 
explain the lack of absorptive capacity. Again this approach rejects the neoclassical assumption 
that economies necessarily achieve the most efficient outcome given the available technology 
'See Bell and Westphal (1984). Endogenous growth models which incorporate this idea are found in Aghion 
and Howitt (1998) and van Marrewijk (1999). 
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and resources. 
The reason that the neoclassical approach makes rather simplistic assumptions is not neces- 
sarily that it view the world as such. One advantage of making those simplifying assumptions 
is that it allows quantitative examinations possible. The possible causes for limited absorptive 
capacity are all plausible and probably more accurate description of the world but it is harder 
to assess their significance quantitatively. This issue is therefore likely to remain controversial. 
In this thesis, I will take the neoclassical approach in that the firms in all countries use the 
same technology at the same efficiency. This is not to dismiss the ideas I have mentioned here. 
The aim is to suggest an alternative explanation for North-South inequality. I will argue that 
even if the same technology is used in all countries, North-South inequality could persist in the 
long run. 
Those who assume that there are differences in technology have found it necessary to do 
so in order to account for the cross-country variations in income and factor prices. To support 
their argument, they point to the apparent differences in the methods of production between 
the rich and poor countries. It is argued that such differences are due to the limited availability 
of technology in the South. Furthermore, it is argued that the endogenous growth models can 
provide the theoretical underpinning for this argument. 
In Chapter 2,1 will show that North-South inequality in per capita income and wages can 
be explained without assuming differences in technology. In this section, I will examine the 
validity of the other two claims. First, I will argue that observed differences in the methods of 
production does not necessarily imply that there are differences in the availability of technology. 
Moreover, endogenous growth models are useful in explaining improvements of technology over 
time but when it is used to explain the cross-country variations in technology, they are less 
convincing. 1 will discuss these two points in turn. 
The methods of production and the availability of technology 
It is apparent that the methods of production used in the rich and poor countries are often 
very different. Such differences are sometimes pointed to as evidence to support the premise 
that the availability of technology differs from country to country. This argument is clearly 
too simplistic. Differences in the chosen method of production do not necessarily imply that 
there are differences in the availability of technology. It is quite plausible that differences in 
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the methods of production reflect differences in factor prices. 
In defence of the neo-classical model, Mankiw (1995) makes the following argument. The 
apparent differences in the method of producing goods and services do not necessarily imply 
that they represent differences in technological levels. Mankiw mentions the method of digging 
ditches as an example. In poor countries, workers use shovels to dig ditches whereas big bull- 
dozers are used by their counterparts in rich countries. Does this imply that the rich countries 
are more technologically advanced? Leave aside the obvious functional differences and assume 
that these two types of tools are used to perform exactly the same task. Mankiw simply states 
that using bulldozers rather than shovels should be regarded as a movement along the same 
production function rather than an upward shift. The answer to the question is an empirical 
one and depends on the cost of using the tools. In particular, it is entirely plausible that the 
method of production is determined by the relative factor prices rather than the availability of 
technology. 
Consider the example of digging ditches again. Casual observations suggest that the sub- 
stitution possibilities between labour and capital (i. e. shovels or bulldozers) are limited. So 
technology is best described by a Leontief production function which requires inputs of labour 
and capital in fixed proportions. Suppose that the two methods of production, shovels and 
bulldozers are describe by the following production function: 
Y=min 
16i 
,L , 
i=S, B, 
/z 
(1,2) 
where K and L are inputs of labour and capital. This subscript S is used for shovels and B for 
bulldozers. The differences in factor requirements are represented by the coefficients, 6 and yi. 
Suppose that the following are the case: 
6s <_ 6 B, (1.3) 
'Ys >- 'yB" (1.4) 
This assumption essentially means that using bulldozers is the more capital intensive of these 
two methods and this seems entirely reasonable. Suppose that technology for both methods are 
commonly known and that firms in low-income countries are able to choose between them. Do 
16 
the firms in low-income countries always choose bulldozers, which most people would regard as 
"technologically advanced"? The answer is no. It is clear that the profit maximizing firm does 
not necessarily use bulldozers given those assumptions. 
In low-income countries, wages needed to attract workers are low relative to the price of 
capital. Therefore, firms are likely to choose a method of production that are more labour 
intensive, i. e. shovels. In this case, firms are using less advanced technology by choice and not 
because "advanced technology" is not available. 
On the other hand, labour costs in high-income countries are generally higher. It is likely 
therefore that firms use technology that allows savings in labour costs. Then they will use 
bulldozers. Hence, we expect to observe that shovels are used in low-income countries while 
bulldozers are in use in high-income countries. In this example, this difference in the method 
of digging is due to factor prices and not availability of technology. 
The point to note is that the apparent differences in the method of production tells very little 
about the technology known to the economy. Using less complicated tools does not necessarily 
mean that firms have access only to less advanced technology. Therefore, the apparent differ- 
ences in the methods of production cannot be interpreted as evidence for limited availability of 
technology. 
The inadequacy of endogenous growth models in accounting for cross-country variations 
Endogenous growth models explicitly specify the process by which technology improves over 
time. However, these models are not suited to explain or justify the assumption that there are 
large differences in the technological level across countries. 
Earlier endogenous growth models assume that the level of technology increases as a result 
of an externality effect from physical and human capital accumulation. The most well-known 
is the model of Arrow (1962), which links the accumulation of non-excludable knowledge to 
the accumulation of physical capital. One interpretation of this model is that knowledge is 
created as firms produce capital goods. Hence, the model is often referred to as the model 
of "learning-by-doing" . 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) use this interpretation and write the 
model in the following simplified way: 
Y= F[K, A(K)L], 
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where K denotes capital, L denotes labour and A(K) represent the level of technology. The 
function F[. ] is a standard neoclassical function and A(K) is monotonically increasing in K. If 
the accumulation of capital (or, equivalently, production of capital goods) were to raise the total 
factor productivity of the aggregate economy, then it must be that newly created knowledge is 
non-excludable and flows freely into the public domain. 9 If we were to argue that the level of 
technology differs across countries, then it would mean that at least some of the spillover effects 
stop at the border. The problem is that if the knowledge freely flows into the public domain 
in one country, it is not clear why it should be so difficult for the firms in other countries to 
make use of this knowledge. Moreover, the firms in the North would have incentives to move 
production to poor countries with lower wages taking the knowledge that has become available 
in the North with them. 
The same argument applies to the model of Lucas (1988,1990), which attributes the exter- 
nality to human capital. Lucas writes the model as 
y=A1c'7h'", 
where y is output per effective worker (y = Y/HL), 
£ is capital per effective worker (k = K/HL) 
and h is human capital per worker (h = H/L). The term h^' is an externality effect. Lucas 
recognises that knowledge is available to all countries and therefore should not be the source 
of differences in the total factor productivity. Therefore, the term h'Y is not due to knowledge 
created as a result of human capital accumulation. In Lucas (1988), he suggests the idea of 
"cluster". The idea is that when there is a concentration of people with human capital, the 
productivity of these people as a whole should be higher than when they are sparsely placed. 
It is obviously hard to quantify such effects and it is not clear how significant, if at all, these 
effects due to interaction of people in proximity are. '0 
Endogenous growth models based on innovation 
The concept of designs or blueprints is used in models of innovation. " A design is non-rival in 
91f knowledge were excludable, then analysis would have to be modified to accommodate increasing returns 
implied by that assumption. 
'°In the brief survey of Lucas (1990), the idea of "cluster" is not mentioned at all. 
"Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1998). 
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production but excludable in that the owner of the design can stop others from making use of 
it. It can be regarded as a one-off fixed cost required for starting production with a degree of 
monopoly power. The creation of designs requires resources and this up-front cost is covered by 
the stream of monopoly profits the design enables the firm to earn once production is started. In 
these models, having a greater number or better quality of designs results in higher total factor 
productivity. It is undoubtedly the case that more innovation takes place in rich countries. 
Some authors argue that this difference in innovation activities demonstrate the differences in 
the availability of technology. 
However, there are difficulties in using the models of innovation to account for North-South 
inequality. An essential part of the models of innovation is that there are externality effects 
from innovation activities. The usual assumption is that creation of designs contributes to the 
accumulation of non-excludable knowledge capital which in turn increases the productivity of 
innovation activities. This assumption is crucial in explaining sustained growth in the long run. 
But this key assumption is what makes the models of innovation less convincing when they are 
used to justify assuming technological differences across countries. If knowledge capital is non- 
excludable, it is difficult to reason that this knowledge capital is accessible to anybody within 
the border but not to those who are outside. It is therefore more reasonable to assume that 
all countries have access to the same knowledge capital. However, if all countries have access 
to such knowledge capital, the model cannot explain the observed pattern of factor prices in 
the rich and poor countries. The details of the argument are found in Grossman and Helpman 
(1991, Chapter 7). In essence, the argument is as follows. The main input for the innovation 
activities is usually assumed to be human capital. Non-excludability of knowledge capital 
implies that the productivity of innovation activities is the same in all countries. Hence, if the 
poorer countries are poor because they do not innovate enough, it must be due to the scarcity 
of human capital. If human capital is scarce in poor countries, then workers with education 
must be earning more in poorer countries than in richer countries. This is not consistent with 
the observed pattern of factor prices. The fact that both skilled and unskilled workers earn 
more in rich countries is the very argument which is directed against the neoclassical model in 
favour of models which incorporate differences in technology. 12 However, models of innovation 
12See Romer (1995). 
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run into exactly the same problem. Thus, attributing the cause of North-South inequality in 
wages to differences in technology has a problem. There does not appear to be any convincing 
explanations for assuming that knowledge transfers do not take place relatively easily. 
Trade in capital goods 
One important aspect of the model of North-South trade presented in Chapter 2 is trade in 
capital goods. It is quite evident that trade in capital goods is an increasingly important part 
of international trade. For example, according to the statistics compiled by the Japanese Tariffs 
Association, nearly 60% of Japanese exports now fall in the category of "capital goods". Many 
authors on development issues emphasise the importance of importing technologically advanced 
capital goods from industrialised economies. A number of empirical studies have shown that the 
price of capital has a significant effect on economic growth. 13 Studies on the growth experience 
of East Asian economies have identified the policy to encourage capital goods imports as the 
key element of the success throughout the region. 14 
These findings are not surprising from the theoretical point of view. If capital becomes 
available at a lower cost as a result of international trade, it will stimulate investment and lead 
to faster growth. It is often assumed that the cause of trade in capital goods is the technological 
advantage of the North over the South. This point should not be confused with the argument 
that the same technology should be available everywhere in the world. When we assert that 
the same technology is available everywhere in the world, what is implied is that if there are 
differences in the level of technology, such differences can explain only a small part of North- 
South inequality. On the other hand, small differences in technology can create opportunities 
for trade, provided that they cover transportation costs and trade barriers. 15 
In any case, North-South trade in capital goods can also be explained by the Hecksher-Ohlin 
trade model, which assumes common technology for all countries. In fact, the neoclassical model 
of trade in capital goods has been studied extensively. 16 In the Hecksher-Ohlin trade model, 
comparative advantages arise from differences in the factor endowments between countries and 
differences in the factor intensities between sectors. Consider the standard two-country, two- 
13 Jones (1994), Lee (1995) 
"World Bank (1993). 
15Eaton and Kortum (2000). 
16For example, Oniki and Uzawa (1965), Baldwin (1966) and Baxter (1992). 
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sector, two-factor neoclassical model of trade and growth. One of the sectors produces consump- 
tion goods while the other produces investment goods. The factors of production are labour 
and capital, both of which are assumed to be internationally immobile. The two countries in 
the model have the same technology and preferences. At the time trade becomes possible, the 
North is more abundant in capital and the South in labour. The behaviour of consumers is 
described by the solution to a standard intertemporal optimisation problem. 
The predictions of the Hecksher-Ohlin trade model are well known. In this case, the North 
will export capital goods to the South if the capital goods sector is more capital intensive. 
As capital accumulation continues in both countries, the price of the capital intensive goods 
gradually falls. It follows from the non-substitution theorem that there is only one equilibrium 
outcome for all economies in the long run, and therefore trade will eventually cease. 17 
Although the model does predict trade in capital goods in the short run, the predictions 
of factor prices and growth rates are widely different from observed facts. First, the rate 
of convergence predicted by this model is likely to be even faster than the one-sector closed 
economy neoclassical model. The reason for this is explained in Baldwin (1966). If the interest 
rate is constant, the effect of trade in capital goods is stimulating investment in the South. The 
availability of cheap imported capital goods makes future consumption relatively inexpensive 
and encourages savings and investment. 18 Hence, the model does not help in explaining that 
convergence of low-income countries does not take place in general. 
One proposed explanation for general absence of convergence in the South is trade barriers 
against imports of capital goods from the North. The most extreme case of this would be a 
closed economy. But we know from the analysis of the one-sector neoclassical model that even 
closed economies should exhibit faster convergence than it is currently the case. Thus, trade 
barrier alone is unlikely to provide an explanation for slow growth rates of low-income countries. 
Richard Baldwin and Elena Seghezza (1996a, 1996b) argue that the effects of trade on 
growth in the neo-classical model is that it stimulates investment in countries that export 
capital-intensive good while it discourages investment in countries which export labour intensive 
1i Oniki and Uzawa (1965) shows the dynamics of the case with a constant savings rate in detail. Baxter (1992) 
examines the effects of tax and fiscal policy in determining the long-run trade patterns. 
1SIn the North, the effect on investment is less clear. Since the consumption good becomes cheaper, there is a 
substitution effect towards current consumption but the income effect may dominate resulting in an increase in 
savings and investment. 
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goods. If this were the case, North-South trade could slow down convergence. However, their 
reasoning neglects the effect of trade in lowering the price of capital goods in the South compared 
to the autarky situation. It is not true to say that North-South trade discourages investment 
in the South. 
The predictions of the neoclassical model for factor prices present another obvious problem. 
It is well known that the Hecksher-Ohlin trade model predicts factor price equalization. When 
specialisation takes place, the factor prices will differ between the economies. However, the 
problem is that a much higher wage rate in the North implies that a much higher rental price 
in the South. Numerical simulations show that it is hard to reconcile the predictions of the 
model with observations. In this regard, the problem is the same as in the case of the one-sector 
neoclassical model. 
Thus, introducing trade in capital goods in the neoclassical framework does not solve the 
problems of the one-sector neoclassical model. If anything, the possibilities of trade make it 
even more difficult to reconcile the predictions of the model with observation. 
The model presented in Chapter 2 predicts that wage rates are higher in the capital-rich 
North and convergence in general does not place. Hence it addresses the inadequacy of the 
neoclassical model while maintaining the assumption that the same technology is available to 
all countries. 
1.3 Total factor productivity growth in East Asia 
The aim of Chapter 3 is to provide explanations for the puzzling finding in a number of growth 
accounting studies for East Asian economies. These studies have shown that TFP growth in 
East Asian economies over the past few decades has been slower than expected. 19 I will argue 
that the characteristics of East Asian growth experience cast doubt on these findings. Two 
types of vintage models are used to show that mismeasurements of capital could have resulted 
in understating TFP residuals. 
First, I will review the purpose of measuring TFP growth and emphasise that growth ac- 
counting is not just an exercise in measuring what we do not know. The primary aim is to 
19Young (1994,1995), Collins and Bosworth (1996). 
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measure the extent of technological progress and hence the economy's long-run growth prospect. 
The term "mismeasurement" in this context therefore means that TFP residuals do not repre- 
sent the economy's long-run growth prospect. 
Quality improvements in goods present a particular problem for growth accounting. It is 
widely agreed that output should be adjusted for quality improvements although it involves a 
number of practical difficulties. Growth accounting adds further complications to the issue. It 
turns out that data for capital inputs should not be adjusted for quality improvements if the 
aim is to obtain meaningful TFP residuals. If the data are adjusted, then it can be shown with 
the vintage model of Solow (1959) that TFP residuals are not a meaningful measure and are 
likely to understate the extent of technological progress in the economy. It is shown that this 
problem of understatement becomes worse in economies which import capital goods such as 
those of East Asia. 
The second strand of the vintage model presented by Solow, Tobin, von Weizsäcker and Yaari 
(1966) suggests another source of mismeasurements in growth accounting. Casual observations 
suggest that the substitution possibilities between labour and capital are limited. If this is 
the case, then investment in new capital has the effect of turning older capital obsolete. Such 
instances of obsolescence are easy to find in reality. For example, a worker with however many 
type-writers at their disposal cannot hope to compete with another similarly skilled worker 
with one modern word processor. As the wage rate rises, the firm would make a loss if they 
continued to employ workers with type-writers. Therefore, when cheap word processors are 
introduced in the economy, most type-writers are made obsolete although they may be in a 
perfect working condition. 
Suppose therefore that the retirement of capital is due to the limitation of substitution 
possibilities between labour and capital. An implication of such limits is that when a large 
amount of new capital is introduced to the economy, the amount of old capital that is made 
obsolete increases; i. e. the retirement rate of capital is endogenously determined. However, 
most growth accounting studies are carried out assuming that the rate of capital depreciation 
is constant. Hence, it is likely that estimates of growth of capital overstates the actual growth 
rate when there is large new investment. Overstating growth in capital in turn reduces TFP 
residuals. I will argue that this hypothesis can account for the particularly slow TFP growth 
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in East Asia between 1973-84. Numerical simulations are used to show that mismeasurements 
due to endogenously determined retirement rate can be quantitatively significant. 
A closer examination of the findings in those growth accounting results appear to confirm 
this model's prediction. In the period when the rate of new investment is particularly high, the 
economy experiences a slowdown in TFP growth. 
Hence, 1 will argue that the finding in growth accounting studies need to be interpreted with 
caution and the pessimism with regard to the technological progress in East Asian economies 
is perhaps unwarranted. 
The model also suggests an explanation for the high TFP growth rates observed after the 
Second World War in some industrialised countries. Destruction of the capital stock during the 
war meant that capital was relatively scarce given the available land and labour. Hence the 
retirement rate of capital is likely to have been lower in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
The logic is simple; it makes economic sense not to throw out capital when it is scarce. Thus, 
growth accounting with a constant depreciation rate for capital would have overestimated the 
retirement rate for capital. Hence, the measured TFP growth rates would have been greater 
than the actual extent of technological progress. The data in Maddison (1988) does show that 
countries with large war damage experienced faster TFP growth rates immediately after the 
Second World War. Again this is consistent with the predictions of the model, assuming that 
the actual rate of technological progress has been stable. Therefore, the model also provides an 
explanation for the high TFP growth for industrialised economies after the Second World War. 
1.4 Open regionalism 
It is widely accepted that free trade policy helps economies grow faster and improves the welfare 
of the economies. Although numerous studies have shown various theoretical possibilities by 
which economies may gain from protection, few mainstream economists would attempt to justify 
a long-run protectionist policy in practice. 
In recent years, a growing number of regional trade blocs have emerged despite the well- 
known problems associated with regionalism. Although regional trade agreements liberalise 
trade within each region, there are concerns that the formation of a trade bloc may worsen 
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the welfare of non-members. Also, once such trade blocs are formed, the member countries 
may become reluctant to take further part in the process of multilateral trade liberalization. 
To avoid these potential problems, the idea of open regionalism has been suggested. The term 
"open regionalism" refers to a number of non-discriminatory arrangements which a trade bloc 
could adopt with regard to trade with non-members. In this study, I will focus on a trading 
arrangement in which the members of a trade bloc extend the trade liberalization measures 
agreed within the bloc to non-member countries on an MFN basis with or without reciprocal 
liberalization on part of the non-members. 
In the literature, it is usually thought that unconditional MFN is not motivated by the 
member countries' self-interest but rather the countries in the bloc are making concessions for 
the wider good. This study shows that this is not always the case. It is shown that some 
members countries of the bloc may gain more from the policy of open regionalism than from 
other forms of regional agreements or global free trade. 
This result is due to the fact that tariffs imposed by one country to manipulate the terms of 
trade in its favour has the effect of benefiting other countries also. A large economy could impose 
tariffs to lower the international price of goods it imports taking advantage of its monopoly 
power. But lower prices of the targeted goods will benefit not only the economy that levies the 
tariffs but also all other economies that import the same goods. When a trade bloc adopts open 
regionalism policy, it tends to encourage non-member countries to increase their trade barriers. 
If the countries in the trade bloc are asymmetric, the lower international prices of some goods 
due to the increased tariffs of non-member countries could benefit some member countries of 
the trade bloc at the expense of others. In certain situations, some member countries in the 
bloc as well as the outside countries obtain a higher welfare level from open regionalism policy 
than in other forms of trading arrangements. Hence, the policy could reduce the incentives 
to pursue further multilateral trade liberalization even for some member countries. In another 
word, open regionalism policy could turn out to be a "stumbling" block to global free trade. 
The analysis in this study is carried out by using numerical simulations. This is necessary 
as the analytical approach becomes intractable when more than two asymmetric economies are 
involved. The examples in this study assume that some coalitional arrangements are ruled out 
for political or other reasons. It is evident that political considerations are invariably involved in 
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the decision making concerning trade bloc formation. Therefore, although such an assumption 
may seem ad hoc, it seems justifiable given the political reality that exists today. 
The approach of this study largely follows Riezman (1985,1999) and Kennan and Riezman 
(1990). First, numerical simulations are used to obtain the welfare levels countries would achieve 
under different trading arrangements. To determine the equilibrium outcome, the concept of 
the core is used. It will be shown that when some coalitional arrangements are ruled out, a 
trading arrangement involving open regionalism can be in the core. Moreover, the welfare levels 
associated with this outcome is such that there is little incentive to pursue multilateral trade 
liberalization not only for the non-member countries but also for some of the member countries. 
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Chapter 2 
Accounting for the cross-country 
variations in factor prices in a 
public-good model of technology 
2.1 Introduction 
Although few would argue that the level of technology is exactly the same across countries, the 
extent to which differences in technology can account for the observed inequality in the living 
standard is less clear. Since knowledge is widely available in print and other forms of media, we 
would expect that firms in all countries have access to broadly similar technology. Capital has 
become increasingly mobile, as confirmed by the relatively small variations in returns to capital. 
However, if knowledge and capital flow freely across borders, standard economic growth models 
cannot explain the large cross-country variations in per capita income. 
The aim of this study is to account for cross-country differences in wages while accepting 
that capital is internationally mobile and technology is a global public-good. I will present 
a model which adds a non-traded consumption good sector to the two-sector AK model of 
Rebelo (1990). This model is applied for the analysis of two trading economies which share 
the same technology but differ in capital per worker. The model predicts that when there is 
large difference in capital per worker, specialisation will take place in the capital rich country. 
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Then the wage rate in the capital rich country will be higher while the return to capital is 
internationally equalised. Moreover, it is shown that inequality in wages will persist in the long 
run. I will also argue that the model's predictions in a number of other aspects are consistent 
with the available evidence. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, I will discuss the problem 
with the neoclassical model in explaining the observed pattern of factor prices. In Section 2.3, 
I will present the three-sector AK model and discuss its properties. Although this model has 
a non-traded consumption good sector, it is essentially the same model as the AK model of 
Rebelo (1990). The importance of including a non-trade good sector becomes only apparent 
in the context of North-South which is analysed in Section 2.4. It is shown that the model 
can explain North-South inequality and the absence of general convergence. In Section 2.5, 
various implications of the model are discussed and it is shown that these are consistent with 
observations. In Section 2.6, the quantitative aspects of the model's predictions are examined 
by means of numerical simulations. This simple quantitative exercise is important in that the 
main criticism against the neoclassical model is its failure to explain the magnitudes observed 
in the data. Concluding remarks are given in the final section. 
2.2 Technology and factor returns 
In this section, I will briefly review the problems with the existing models in accounting for 
the observed pattern of factor prices. The essence of the problem is as follows. It is hard to 
explain why the level of technology should differ widely across countries given the non-excludable 
nature of knowledge. However, if we assume that the same technology is available everywhere 
in the world, the predictions of the standard models for factor prices will be inconsistent with 
observations. 
The basic neoclassical model 
As we discussed in Chapter 1, it is hard to explain why the level of technology should differ 
widely across countries. Therefore, the neoclassical model assumes that the same technology is 
available to all countries. 
The problem with the predictions of the neoclassical growth model can be illustrated with 
28 
a model of the form: 
Aka, (2.1) 
where y and k denote income per worker and capital per worker respectively. The parameter 
A is often referred to as the "technological level" of the economy. It is clear that if the same 
technology is available everywhere in the world, cross-country variations in per capita income 
must be due to differences in the amount of per capita capital. However, if poor countries 
are poor because they have less capital, a simple calculation shows that the marginal product 
of capital in poorer countries would be vastly larger than in rich countries. Suppose that per 
capita income in rich countries is ten times larger than that in poor countries. If we take the 
factor share of capital to be a= 1/3, the model implies that the marginal product of capital 
in poor countries would be one hundred times larger than in rich countries. Clearly, this is not 
the case. On the contrary, the observed variations in returns to physical capital are relatively 
small. 
The neoclassical model with human capital 
A neoclassical approach to remedy the problem with the predictions of the basic model is to 
include a third factor of production, human capital. ' Throughout this study, the term "human 
capital" is used to represent the skill and knowledge embodied in workers as opposed to the 
general knowledge the society accumulates. 
There are two ways of incorporating human capital into the model. The first is to assume 
that human capital augments labour and assumes a production function of the form Y= 
AKa(LiHi)1-a where HZ is the human capital per unit of labour. The combined unit (LZHZ) 
is sometimes referred to as the effective labour. The second approach is to treat workers with 
human capital as a different factor of production from workers without human capital. With 
this approach, workers without human capital are usually referred to as unskilled workers and 
workers with human capital are called skilled workers. In this case, the production function can 
be written as Y= AKaHf L? -c'-0 where L represents the number of unskilled workers and H 
the number of skilled workers. The differences in these two approaches are merely a matter of 
definition but it needs to be made clear which approach is taken. 
1 MIankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1994). 
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Suppose that we take the first approach and assume that the cross-country variations in 
wages are due to the differences in the average human capital embodied in workers, which also 
affect equilibrium per capita capital. Lucas (1990) uses the estimates of human capital stock 
from Krueger (1968) to show that including human capital considerably reduces the difference 
in the marginal product of capital implied by the model even though a large difference still 
remains. 2 However, this explanation is rather problematic. Lucas points out that if including 
human capital eliminated the difference in the marginal product of capital completely, this 
would lead to another prediction which is empirically unsustainable. Suppose that the return 
to capital is internationally equalised. Then the constant-returns-to-scale technology implies 
that the return to effective labour must also be the same across countries. This would mean 
that workers with the same skill level would earn the same wages whether they are in rich 
countries or in poor countries. This appears to be contrary to observations. 
The same problem can be seen in the context of the model using the second approach. 
Suppose that there are two type of workers, skilled and unskilled. In a comment to Mankiw 
(1995), Romer (1995) considers the implication of the model with the following ratios which 
approximate the observed relative factor returns. Consider two countries, the rich and the poor. 
Capital is assumed to be mobile between the two countries and therefore the returns to capital 
are the same. Skilled workers earn twice as much as unskilled workers in the rich country. The 
wage for unskilled workers in the rich country is ten times that of unskilled workers in the 
poor country. If we take ci =ß= 1/3, then the one-sector neoclassical model together with 
these ratios imply that the ratio of the skilled wage to the unskilled wage in the poor country 
would be an implausibly large two hundred. If this were the case, skilled workers in the rich 
country would earn ten times more by moving to the poor country. One would therefore expect 
skilled workers to migrate from richer countries to poorer countries in large numbers. 3 Again, 
this is not the case. Hence, including human capital creates another set of problems for the 
neoclassical model in explaining the observed cross-country variations in factor prices. 
2 According to Lucas' calculations, the model without human capital predicts that the marginal product of 
capital in India should be 58 times of that in the United States. Including human capital reduces the ratio of 
predicted return to 5. 
3It is not difficult to think of an economic reasons for the skilled workers wanting to stay in a rich country 
even if there are opportunities to earn higher wages in a poor country. For example, if the government of the 
country provides non-rival public goods, then the government of a rich country can provide more public goods 
to its residents than a poor country's government for given a tax rate. 
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If we abandon the public-good assumption for technology and allow the technological level 
to differ across countries, the predictions of the factor prices can easily be made consistent 
with the observed pattern. The problem with this approach is that it is difficult to explain 
why there should be such large differences in technological levels. Some authors have applied 
endogenous growth models to justify the argument. The key idea in these models is the existence 
of excludable designs or blueprints. As I have discussed in Chapter 1, however, these models 
do not solve the problem. Factor price equalisation applies in these endogenous growth models 
also. 
A variant of the AK model presented in this study shows that North-South inequality 
could result from differences in the capital stock and the observed pattern of the factor prices 
can be explained without assuming differences in technology. I will first present the closed 
economy model in the next section and then discuss how this model can be applied to analysis 
of North-South trade and growth. 
2.3 The closed economy model 
There are three sectors in the economy indexed by the subscript Z. Sector 1 produces the 
non-traded consumption good and Sector 2 produces the traded consumption good. Sector 3 
produces the investment good which is assumed to be tradable. The two consumption goods 
are produced according to a Cobb-Douglas technology: 
Y= KaLz -a i=1,2, (2.2) 
where KZ and Li denote capital and labour used in producing sector i output. Although the 
factor shares may differ between these two sectors, it adds little to the model in this context. 
Therefore I have assumed that the two consumption good sectors have the same production 
function to simplify the analysis. 
The investment good sector is assumed to have the linear production function as in the AK 
model: 
Y3 = AK3. (2.3) 
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Y, 
Y, 
Figure 2-1: The production possibility set of the three sector model 
z 
It is important to note that production is assumed to be linear in physical capital. The non- 
diminishing returns exhibited by this production function is not due to knowledge externality 
as assumed in some variants of the AK model. For a given supply of labour and capital, 
the production possibility set in three dimensions will look like Figure 2-1. The production 
possibility frontier on the Yl - Y2 plane is a straight line since I have assumed that the factor 
intensities of these two sector are the same. 
The rest of the model follows standard growth models. The representative household in 
this economy aims to maximize intertemporal utility over an infinite horizon. Let Cl (t) denote 
consumption of the non-traded consumption good and C2(t) denotes consumption of the traded 
consumption good. Preferences are given by 
e -Pt [ log Cl + (1 -) log C2] , 
U= f°° (2.4) 
where p denotes the subjective discount rate and 0 denotes the expenditure share of the non- 
traded consumption good. There is a market for consumption loans which allow the households 
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to lend and borrow freely at the instantaneous interest rate r. Let the traded consumption 
good be the numeraire and denote the price of the non-traded consumption good by p(t) and 
the price of the investment good by q(t). Provided that both consumption goods are being 
produced as it will be the case in the closed economy, p(t) = 1. Each household is endowed 
with one unit of labour. The budget constraint for the representative household is given by 
00 /'00 1 
e-R(t) [Cl (t)p(t) + C2(t)] dt <J e-R(t) w(t) dt + W, (2.5) 00 
where R(t) = fo r(T) dT and W denotes the assets the household holds at time 0. 
The total stock of capital in the economy is denoted by K(t). Capital is assumed to 
depreciate at a constant rate 6. The accumulation of capital is described by 
K(t) =1(t) - ÖK(t), 
(2.6) 
where I (t) denotes investment. Let L denote the number of household which is assumed to be 
fixed. Then resource constraints for the factors of production are given by 
L1 + L2 -L=0, (2.7) 
K1+K2+K3-K(t) = 0. (2.8) 
Finally, the market clearing conditions for output are given by 
Cl - Yl = 0, (2.9) 
C2-Y2 = 0, (2.10) 
I- Y3 = 0. (2.11) 
Equilibrium path 
Maximization of (2.4) subject to the budget constraint gives the growth rates of consumption: 
Cl 
_ 
C2 
=r-p. (2.12) Cl C2 
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The no-arbitrage condition is given by 
A+ q(tý -S= r(t), 
(2.13) 
q(t) 
where q(t) denote the price of investment goods. Let 7r denote the rate of decrease in the price 
of investment goods; q/q = -ir. Combining (2.12) and (2.13), the growth of consumption per 
household can be obtained: 
Cl=C2=A-(7r+p+b) 
Cl C2 
(2.14) 
Factor markets are assumed to be competitive and capital is mobile between sectors. Hence 
the marginal product of capital is equalised across sectors: 
q(t)A = aKa-'Li -`x i=1,2. (2.15) 
From these equations, the following can be obtained: 
7r = (1 - cti)(A -p- 6), (2.16) 
9K = (A -p- b), (2.17) 
CZ 
= cx(A -p- S). (2.18) CZ 
It is noted that these growth rates do not depend on the capital to labour ratio. As pointed 
out by Rebelo (1991), the model has no transitional dynamics. 
The fact that there is no transitional dynamics simplifies the analysis of the effects of 
international trade. Since all variables are growing at a constant rate, the "snapshot" of the 
economy will look the same at all point in time (except in sizes). Therefore, we can treat the 
model as if it is a static model. 
Before examining the consequences of the North-South trade, it is worth considering the 
patten of factor prices the model predicts when economies are closed. Suppose no trade takes 
place between economies and consider the differences between the capital-rich North and the 
capital-poor South. 
The first point to note is that the share of capital allocated to each sector is constant in this 
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model. It follows from growth rate of capital given in (2.17) that the share of capital allocated 
to the investment good sector is (1 - p/A). This means that an economy with a larger amount 
of capital per worker will always have greater capital per worker employed in the consumption 
good sectors. It is easy to deduce therefore that the wage rate will be higher in the North, 
where there is more capital per worker, than in the South. As the price of capital falls at 
the same rate, (1 - a)(A - p), the interest rate will be the same in both economies. Income 
and consumption per household also increase with the amount of the capital stock. Thus, if 
we assume that the economies are closed, the predictions of the model are consistent with the 
fact that there are large cross-country variations in income and wages while the variations in 
interest rates are small. 
It is clear, however, that we observe North-South inequality in reality while trade takes 
place between the rich and poor countries. In the next section therefore I will apply this three 
sector model to analysis of North-South trade. 
2.4 International trade and North-South inequality in wages 
To examine the pattern of factor prices when North-South trade takes place, the model needs 
to be modified to accommodate the fact that trade is now possible. The subscripts N and S 
are used to indicate the economies, the North and the South respectively. The market clearing 
conditions for the two traded goods, i. e. (2.10) and (2.11) in the closed economy model, are 
replaced by 
C2N+C2s-Y2N-Y2S=O, 
and 
(2.19) 
IN+IS-Y3N-Y3S=0. (2.20) 
The rest of the economy is essentially the same as the closed economy model. 
Changes brought about by North-South trade are most easily illustrated with the use of 
diagrams. For the purpose of analysis in this section, it is useful to examine the Yl - Y2 
plane of the production possibility set in (2-1). The production possibility frontier for the two 
consumption good sectors for a given level of output in the investment good sector can be drawn 
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Non-traded good 
FF 
YFF 
Figure 2-2: The effect of trade in the South 
on this plane. 
Suppose that the economies are initially in autarky. The North has a larger amount of 
capital per worker. Thus, the autarky price of the investment good is lower in the North 
than in the South. When trade opportunities open up, the North exports the investment good 
and imports the traded consumption good. The effects of trade can be shown in Figure 2-2, 
Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4. 
No specialisation case 
Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3 shows the case when no specialisation takes place in either economy. 
The changes in production and consumption in the South is shown in Figure 2-2. The traded 
consumption good is represented on the horizontal axis and the non-traded good on the vertical 
axis. Consumption is measured from the point OA, and hence the indifference curves U0 and 
Ul have the origin at OA. The origin of the production possibility set is at OA in autarky but 
moves to OF when trade is allowed. The production possibility set in autarky is the triangle 
OADAEA. When trade is opened up, the production possibility set expands to OFDFEF. This 
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Figure 2-3: The effect of trade in the North without specialisation 
change is due to the fact that the investment good sector in the South contracts when trade 
with the North is opened up. Hence capital shifts from the investment good sector to the two 
consumption good sectors expanding the production possibility set. As a result, production of 
the non-traded good increases from OAY1A to OFYiF and production of traded goods increases 
from OAY2A to OFY2F " 
Although the quantity equal to the length OFOA is exported to the 
North, both of these goods are consumed more at the new equilibrium CF than in autarky. 
Figure 2-3 shows the changes in the North as a result of opening up of trade. The production 
possibility set in autarky is represented by the triangle OAFAGA. The autarky equilibrium is 
at the point CA . 
Note that the relative price of the two consumption goods is equal to the 
slope of the production possibility frontier on the Yl - Y2 plane. The relative price will be the 
same in both economies as long as both sectors produce positive output. 
Both production and consumption of the traded consumption good are represented by the 
length OAY2A and for the non-traded good by OAY1A. This consumption set at CA gives the 
utility level of Uo. When the opportunity to trade with the South opens up, the investment 
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good sector expands reducing the production possibility set to the triangle OFFFGF. The 
new equilibrium is represented by the point CF. Production of the non-traded good increase 
to OFY1F" Although production of the traded consumption good decreases to OFY2F, its 
consumption increases to ONY2F due to the import from the South. 
In this case with no specialisation in either economy, all good and factor prices are equalised. 
This example does not help explain the observed pattern of factor prices. However, a more 
interesting case is when the North specialises and ceases production of the non-traded good. 
Specialisation in the North 
When differences in capital per worker is very large in autarky, it is possible that specialisa- 
tion takes place in the North alone or both in the North and in the South when trade is opened 
up. Specialisation in the South means that the investment goods sector shuts down. In this 
case, the return to capital would be higher in the South and hence it can only be temporary. 
Numerical simulations indicate that specialisation in the South is very unlikely. Therefore I 
will only consider the case of specialisation in the North where the traded consumption good 
sector shuts down. 
When the difference is sufficiently large, the North will cease production of the traded 
consumption good. This is illustrated in Figure 2-4. It is evident that the slope tangent to the 
indifference curve at the point CF in Figure 2-4 is less steep than the production possibility 
frontier. In the South, the relative price of the two consumption goods are still equal to the 
slope of the production possibility frontier. Therefore it follows that the price of the non-traded 
good measured in units of the traded good is higher in the North. 
Thus, I have demonstrated that the price of the non-traded good is higher in the North 
when specialisation takes place. If the price of the non-traded good is higher in the North, 
it follows that the wage rate in the North will be also be higher. This result can formally be 
stated as follows. 
Proposition 1 Suppose that trade takes place and the capital-rich economy specialises and 
stops production of the traded consumption good. Then the real wage in the capital-rich economy 
will be higher than in the capital-poor economy. 
Proof 
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Figure 2-4: The effect of trade in the North with specialisation 
Let wj denote the wage measured in units of the traded consumption good. The traded good 
is used as the numeraire. Thus, in order to show that the real wage is higher in the North, it 
would be sufficient to show that wir > wS and WN/PN = WS/Ps- 
The rental price capital is equal to q(t)A. Since trade equalises the price of the investment 
good, the rental price must be equal in both economies. Then, it must be that specialisation 
in the North is due to its higher wage rate. If this were not the case, the cost of producing 
the traded goods would be the same in the North and specialisation would not take place. It 
therefore follows that 
wir > ws. (2.21) 
The variation in the price of the non-traded good can be written as 
dpi 
--a 
dr 
+ a) 
dw 
-(1--. Pi rw 
(2.22) 
Since the rental price of capital is the same in both economies, the higher wage rate in the North 
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implies that the price of the non-traded goods must be higher in the North. Furthermore, the 
proportional difference in the output price is smaller than the proportional difference in wages. 
It follows therefore that 
WN>ws 
PN PS 
Thus, the real wage is lower in the South. Q. E. D. 
(2.23) 
Hence the predictions of the model are that the return to capital is internationally equalised 
while the wage rate is higher in the North. These predictions are consistent with the observed 
pattern of factor prices. As we will see later, numerical simulations show that adding skilled 
labour as a third factor production changes this pattern of prices little. Thus, we have a model 
that can account for the observed cross-country variations in factor prices without assuming 
differences in technology. 
2.5 Other predictions of the model 
The three sector AK model presented in the last section has a number of predictions other than 
those of factor prices that are consistent with observations. These are the price of non-traded 
goods, the falling price of investment goods and the absence of general convergence. In this 
section, I will discuss these predictions in turn. 
The price of non-traded goods 
As we have seen in the last section, the model predicts the price of the non-traded good to be 
lower in the South than in the North. It is a well recognised fact that non-traded goods tend 
to be more expensive in richer countries. In the literature, there are two strands of theories 
that account for the lower prices of non-traded goods in poorer countries. One of them relies 
on international differences in technology. 4 The idea is that the traded good sector in richer 
countries has a higher level of productivity while there are little differences in the productivity 
of the non-traded good sector. Such differences in productivity will result in a higher price of 
the non-traded good (measured relative to the traded goods) in richer countries. 
Bhagwati (1984) formalises this idea in a general equilibrium framework and show that this 
4Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964). 
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explanation has two unrealistic implications. One of them is that the wage-rental ratio will be 
equal across countries. The wage-rental ratio is clearly higher in richer countries. Second, capital 
to labour ratios are equal across countries within each activity. Bhagwati therefore presents 
an alternative model which explains the lower price of non-traded goods in terms of factor 
endowments. Like the model presented in this study, it relies on the fact that specialisation 
takes place so that factor price equalisation no longer holds. The difficulty with the Bhagwati's 
model is that it would predict implausibly large returns to capital in low-income countries just 
as in the single sector neoclassical model discussed earlier. 
The model presented in this study retains the spirit of Bhagwati's model and at the same 
time reconciles its predictions with the observed pattern of factor prices by assuming the AK 
structure for the investment good sector. 
Falling price of the investment good. 
Although assuming the AK structure seems ad hoc at first, the evidence on the relative price of 
investment goods is consistent with this model. The model predicts that the price of the invest- 
ment good measured in units of the consumption good falls over time. Greenwood, Hercowitz 
and Krusell (1997) and Hercowitz (1988) use the data on the price of capital goods compiled 
by Gordon (1990) to show that the price of investment goods in the U. S. has indeed fallen over 
time. 
The authors of these studies attribute the falling price of the investment good to the tech- 
nological progress specific to the investment good sector. Their findings, however, are entirely 
consistent with the variant of the AK model presented in this study. In fact, the vintage model 
of Solow (1959) on the balanced growth path behaves in the exactly the same as the two-sector 
AK model of Rebelo (1991). 
The falling price of the investment good has another implication. Jones (1994) finds that 
the share of investment in GDP has grown over the years in industrialised countries while the 
growth rate has remained stable. Jones cites this finding as evidence against the AK model. 
However, this is exactly what the two-sector AK model of Rebelo (1991) and its variant in this 
study predicts. According to these models, investment measured in real terms grows faster than 
output. Therefore the finding in Jones (1994) that investment shares in developed countries 
are showing an upward trend is consistent with the prediction of the model. 
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Convergence 
One of the problems with the predictions of the neoclassical growth model is the absence of 
general convergence. Although growth in a small subset of low-income countries such as those 
of East Asia have outperformed high-income countries, this is not generally the case. The model 
presented in this study could explain this observed pattern of growth rates. 
In the two-sector AK model and its variant presented in this study, the growth rate does 
not depend on income per capita and economies grow at a constant rate. Hence we do not 
expect convergence to take place in general. 
At the same time, the model can explain why a small subset of low income countries do 
succeed in achieving much faster growth rates than in rich countries. Let ZA denote output 
of the South in autarky and ZF denote output when trade is allowed. National output in this 
model is defined as Z= Yl + Y2 + qY3. Suppose that the South is initially in autarky and 
opens up for trade at time to. The growth in the South before and after time to is depicted 
in Figure 2-5. At time to, the equilibrium price of the investment good falls and output of 
the investment good sector falls as a result. Capital shifts from the investment good sector 
to the consumption good sectors. Since capital can be reallocated from one sector to another 
instantaneously, output "jumps" to the new level. The economy resumes expansion at the 
balanced growth rate as before but at a higher level. 
In reality, reallocation of capital from one sector to another is likely to take time if possible 
at all. It is conceivable that new equilibrium allocation of capital is reached largely through 
new investment. Hence the economy is likely to have a transitional phase to a new balanced 
growth path rather than an instantaneous "jump". In such a transitional phase, the return to 
capital will in fact be higher in the South. In any case, it is clear that opportunities to import 
the investment good from high-income countries could allow faster growth rate in low income 
countries. The potential for faster growth is determined by the length equal to ZF - ZA in 
Figure 2-5. It is easy to see that this length is in turn determined by the equilibrium terms-of- 
trade between the North and the South. If the terms-of-trade is closer to the autarky price of 
the North, the new equilibrium income level of the South will be closer to that of the North. On 
the other hand, if the South levies tax on capital good imports, the potential for catching-up 
will be smaller. 
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Figure 2-5: The effect of trade on growth in the South 
Thus, the model predicts that convergence does not take place in general. However, less 
developed countries which open up for trade with richer countries will experience faster growth 
provided that the equilibrium terms-of-trade favours them. 
We note from the analysis in the previous section that countries with a higher savings rate 
grow faster. Encouraging imports of capital goods from developed countries and having high 
savings rates are the hallmarks of the East Asian growth experience. It is no surprise therefore 
that East Asian economies have been successful. 
Using a slightly modified AK model, Lee (1995) argues that the economy would have a 
transitional dynamics. Furthermore, if tax is levied on capital good imports from the North, 
the growth rate of the South in this transitional phase would be slower. I will show in the 
appendix why this argument is incorrect and the economy has no transitional dynamics even 
in his modified model. However, economies with less tax on imports are likely to grow faster 
in response to opening up of opportunities to import capital goods from the North. Lee is 
correct in arguing that the model predicts a negative correlation between growth rates and tax 
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to time 
of capital goods imports but his reasoning is incorrect. 
2.6 Numerical investigation of the model's predictions 
The analysis so far has shown that it is possible to explain the observed pattern of factor prices. 
This explanation, however, relies on the fact that specialisation takes place in the North. It is 
then necessary to ask how likely it is that such specialisation takes place. Furthermore, although 
it can be shown that wages will be higher in the North qualitatively, would the prediction be 
of right magnitude? What effects including human capital in the model have? In this section, 
I will examine these are the quantitative aspect of the three-sector AK model of North-South 
trade using numerical simulations. 
Numerical simulations are carried out with an artificial set of numbers. The two-economy 
model is highly stylised and the aim here is not to reproduce the world economy accurately. 
These numerical examples are used to assess the magnitude of the predictions of the model 
using a set of reasonable parameter values. 
The importance of this numerical exercise is in the fact that the main criticism against the 
public-good model of technology is that it predicts an implausible patten of factor prices. In a 
comment on Mankiw (1995), Romer uses the following approximate ratios of factor returns to 
point out that the neoclassical growth model is empirically unsustainable: 
" The wage of unskilled workers in the poorest countries is one-tenth of the wage of unskilled 
workers in the United States. 
" The ratio of the wage of skilled workers to that of unskilled workers is two in the United 
States. 
" The rates of return on physical capital are internationally the same. 
Given these ratios, the one-sector neoclassical model, Y= AK, 
/3H2 /3Li /3, 
predicts that 
the wage of a skilled worker is two hundred times the wage of an unskilled worker in the poorest 
countries. The return to education is larger in the poorest countries than in the United States 
by a factor of one hundred. This is so wide of the mark that it does put the usefulness of the 
neoclassical model into question. 
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Romer suggests that the return to education in the poorest countries is two or three times the 
return in the United States. Therefore, if we take the unskilled wages in the poorest countries 
to be one, then the ratio of wages would be 
Unskilled wage Skilled wage 
United States 10 20 
Poorest Country 13 or 4 
The aim of the simulations is to examine whether the AK model discussed in this study 
could predict wage inequalities of a similar order. We need to note first that the three-sector AK 
model is a two-economy of trade in which the terms of trade is determined endogenously. Thus, 
when we apply the model for the analysis of North-South inequality, a correct interpretation 
would, for example, be that the North is the OECD countries put together and the South is 
the rest of the world. The ratios of wages suggested by Romer is for the United States and the 
poorest countries. If we compare the average wages in the OECD countries with those of the 
rest of world, we expect that the order of inequality would be less but the pattern of inequality 
is likely to be the same. 
The fact that the model has no transitional dynamics simplifies the experiment considerably. 
All real variables grow at a constant rate and the ratio of wages do not change over time. Hence, 
the experiments can be carried out in a static setting. ' 
The following changes are made to the model to include skilled labour. The production 
function in (2.2) are replaced by 
Y= KZ H7Li -ý-'' i=1,2, (2.24) 
where HZ denotes skilled labour. As before, the production functions for the two consumption 
good sectors are the same. The supply of both types of labour is assumed to be fixed. In 
addition to (2.7) and (2.8), the following resource constraint is added: 
H1+H2-fl =O, 
where 17 denotes the fixed supply of skilled labour. 
`'Demand for investment is such that it results in capital growing at the equilibrium rate. 
(2.25) 
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In order to determine the parameter values in the model, 1 will make the following further 
assumptions. The factor shares in the aggregate income are one third each for unskilled workers, 
skilled workers and physical capital. The growth rate of income measured in units of the 
consumption goods is 1%. The subjective discount rate (plus the rate of physical depreciation 
of capital) is 0.05. The share of investment in national income is 1/6. The share of consumption 
of traded goods and consumption of non-traded goods in national income are 1/6 and 2/3 
respectively. 6 These assumptions imply that A 0.1 and the factor shares in the consumption 
goods sectors are (=0.2 and 77 = 0.4. 
The supplies of the factors are assumed to be as follows; 
Unskilled Workers Skilled Workers Physical Capital 
North 42 60 
South 45 15 60 
The South has 10 times as many workers as the North. The ratio of skilled to unskilled 
workers is 1: 2 in the North and 1: 3 in the South. Capital per worker in the North is 10 times as 
large as the South. Given this pattern of endowments, the North will specialise in production 
of the non-traded consumption good and the investment good. The equilibrium ratios of the 
wages are as follows: 
Unskilled wage Skilled wage 
North 4.5 9.0 
South 13. 
Hence, the model does produce a pattern of factor prices in which both skilled and unskilled 
workers are paid more in the North. 7 The ratio of unskilled and skilled wages exactly reflect 
the ratios of the two types of labour supplies. Given that skilled workers earn three times as 
much in the North as in the South, the model predicts the net-flow of skilled workers to be from 
the South to the North and therefore it is consistent with observations. Although the model is 
a highly stylised one, this example demonstrates that the observed pattern of factor prices can 
be reproduced without assuming differences in technology. 
6Admittedly, these numbers are more representative of industrialised countries than those of developing 
countries. However, the same set of parameters are used for both economies in order to assess the effect of 
differences in capital per worker. 
'The structure of the model ensures that the return to capital is equalised. 
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We can use the simulation above as the benchmark and vary some of the parameters to 
investigate the implications of these changes for the predicted inequality. 
A. Difference in the per capita endowment of capital. 
Suppose the parameters of the model are as in the previous example but factor supplies are 
different. The numbers of skilled and unskilled workers are the same as before but the residents 
in the North are assumed to own twenty times more capital worker rather than ten times in 
the benchmark simulation. In this case, the ratio of the wage are as follows: 
Unskilled wage Skilled wage 
North 6.9 13.8 
South 1.0 3.0 
As expected, the North-South wage inequality increases. Note that the wages in this case differ 
from the benchmark case by relatively a small amount considering that capital per worker is 
doubled. The actual capital stock is hard to estimate, especially in developing countries. But 
the results here suggest that the predictions of the model are not too sensitive to the amount 
of capital stock. 
B. Different factor intensities between sectors. 
If we replace the production functions of the two consumption goods sectors with a more capital 
intensive one so that the factor shares are one third each for unskilled workers, skilled workers 
and capital (i. e. 71 =ý= 1/3), this also has the effect of increasing the wages in the North; 
Unskilled wage Skilled wage 
North 5.3 10.6 
South 1.0 3.0 
C. Less expenditure on the traded goods. 
Suppose that the expenditure shares in aggregate consumption are such that one tenth (rather 
than one fifth in the benchmark above) is spent on traded goods. This again increases equilib- 
rium wages in the North. Perhaps, this is not surprising. If the expenditure share of the traded 
goods shrinks, an open economy becomes more like a closed one; 
Unskilled wage Skilled wage 
North 6.8 13.5 
South 1.0 3.0 . 
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These experiments are carried out simply to assess the properties of the model and the 
numbers used are completely artificial. However, it is evidently possible to replicate the pattern 
of factor prices mentioned in Romer (1995). 
The predictions of the one-sector neoclassical model for factor prices are clearly at odds 
with observations. This inconsistency has been used as an argument against assuming that the 
same technology is available in all countries. However, the three-sector model presented in this 
study show that is entirely possible to explain the observed pattern of factor prices without 
introducing large cross-country differences in technology into the model. 
2.7 Concluding remarks 
This study is motivated by the unsatisfactory nature of using differences technology for ex- 
plaining cross-country variations in factor prices. The level of technology is not an observable 
quantity. If we were to argue that the availability of technology is the problem, we would need 
to explain why it is so difficult for less developed economies to adopt better technology. In 
the absence of such explanations, the approach taken in this study and explanations based on 
inefficiency of factor allocation as suggested in Olson (1996) seem to be more promising. 
One difficulty in this debate is that it is often hard to distinguish changes due to capital 
accumulation from those due to technological progress. The suitability of technology may 
depend on the income level of the country. For example, a certain marketing strategy may be 
very effective in industrialised economies in raising the overall productivity. But if the aim is to 
alleviate the poverty in a less developed country, it is doubtful that marketing strategies have 
much relevance. It would be premature to conclude that the availability of technology is the 
problem from the observations that technologies and business practices are different between 
the rich and poor countries. 
There is a general consensus in the empirical literature that the savings rate and free trade 
policy have positive impact on growth in less developed economies. The predictions of the 
three-sector AK model are consistent with these findings. Moreover, since the terms of trade is 
an important determinant of the income level, the model re-emphasise the importance of trade 
liberalization in the North for imports from the South as well as lowering trade barriers against 
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imports of producer durables in the South. 
It would be a useful attempt to develop the model into an applied general equilibrium 
model. The model identifies a dynamic gain from liberalization in North-South trade. It is 
quite possible that such a dynamic gain is larger than suggested by studies using a static 
model. 
The crucial assumption of the model is that production of the investment good is not subject 
to diminishing returns in capital. The fact that the price of capital goods relative to the price 
of consumption goods is falling over the years supports this hypothesis of the model. But a 
more direct test of this hypothesis would be a useful investigation. 
It is worth noting that the AK model of Rebelo demonstrates that non-diminishing returns 
in the capital goods sector alone is enough to sustain long-run growth. The capital goods sector 
forms a relatively small part of the economy. In Brue (1993), the origin and the use of the law 
of diminishing returns is discussed. Brue comments that "the history of economic theory has 
produced an axiomatic acceptance of the law of diminishing returns". Empirical studies of cost 
functions seem to be much needed. 
Unlike the two-sector model, the three-sector model has another testable implication. If the 
wage inequality were to be explained by the model, the traded consumption goods sector in the 
North would be shut. This means that products of the North are not competing with imports 
from the South. This appears to be consistent with observation but a detailed study on this 
issue is also needed. 
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Appendix A: The effects of tax on capital goods imports 
Lee (1995) uses a variant of the two-sector AK model discussed in Rebelo (1991) to consider 
the effects of ad valorem tax on imports of capital goods. Lee's argument is correct in asserting 
that such tax on capital good imports has a negative effect on growth rates. However, the 
derivation and reasoning of the results are incorrect. The problem arises from the fact that Lee 
understands the model to have a transitional dynamics. However, as pointed out by Rebelo, the 
model has no transitional dynamics. Introduction of imperfectly substitutable capital goods 
does not change this property of the model. 
In what follows, the notations follow those used in Lee (1995) and differ slightly from the 
ones I have used in this chapter so far. The model is essentially the same as the two-sector 
model of Rebelo (1991). The consumption goods sector is written as 
C= ((DK)`xLl-`l, 0<a<1, 
where -cD is a faction of the capital stock employed in the consumption goods sector. The supply 
of labour is normalised to equal 1. Lee's model is different in that the capital goods are a 
composite of the domestically produced capital goods and the imported capital goods. Thus, 
newly produced final capital goods, I, is given by the Cob-Douglas combination of domestic 
and foreign capital goods: 
I= ID rylryl, ý 
where ID denotes the domestic capital goods while IM denotes the imported capital goods. 
Production of the domestic capital good has the AK structure: 
ID = A(1 - -4ý)K, 
where (1 - 4ý) is the share of the total capital stock that is used for production of capital 
goods. Take the consumption goods as the numeraire and let p and pAI denote the price of the 
domestic and foreign capital goods respectively. The price of the foreign capital goods is given 
and falling at the rate (1 - c) (A - p) . This is 
because the economy in the North is described 
by the two-sector AK model. Since factor markets are competitive, the following relationships 
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must hold: 
pA(1 - ry)Z'y a(P'-1Kcx- 
PM - P'YZry-1, 
where Z= IM/ID. The first of these two expressions equate the marginal product of capital 
in the capital goods sector and the consumption goods sector. The second is derived from 
the condition that the marginal product of imported capital goods is equal to its price. The 
expression for the interest rate can be obtained from the no-arbitrage conation pA(1 - ! y)Z^" + 
p/p = r. Then the growth of consumption is given by 
cp 
= pA (1 - -y) Z-" +--p, 
cp 
and the growth of the capital stock is 
A(1 - 4D)ZY. 
From these two equation, Lee concludes that the growth rate is positively related to the share 
of foreign capital goods. Lee comments that "During the transitional period in which a LCD 
economy approaches the steady state from a low initial level of capital stock, the capital stock 
and per capita income rise monotonically towards their steady-state values". He also states 
that "Throughout the transitional period, the growth rate of income is higher in an economy 
with a higher ratio of imports in investment (Z). " 
Both of these statements are incorrect. First, the model has no transitional dynamics. The 
economy is always on the balanced growth path irrespective of the capital to labour ratio. 
Second, the ratio of foreign to domestic capital goods is determined by the technology and does 
not depend of the amount of capital stock. These points can be shown as follows. 
Given the demand for investment, I, the demand for domestic and foreign capital goods is 
given by 
ID=I(1-^y), 
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and 
Im =-yp . PM 
Thus, the ratio of foreign to domestic capital goods Z is given by 
p ry 
Pm l-'Y 
Since pm = p'yZ-Y-1, combining these two expressions gives 
ZY= (1 - Y)-1, 
i. e. the ratio Z is constant. It follows that the ratio of the prices of domestic and foreign capital 
goods must also be constant. Lee assumes that the technology and preferences are the same in 
all countries. The growth rate of consumption is therefore, 
= a(A - P), 
which is the same as the closed economy. The proportion of capital used in each sector is 
constant even when trade is involved (i. e (D is constant). This can be shown as follows. The 
resource constraint for the consumption good is 
Yi-c-PAIIM=0. 
Given the expression equating marginal returns, the capital stock employed in the consumption 
good sector must grow at the rate (A - p). Since Lee normalises the labour supply to one, 
output grows at the rate a(A - p). Given the growth rate of Yl, C and pm, it follows that 
IpI must be growing at the rate (A - p). Since the relative demand for inputs are fixed, the 
demand for IAI must also be the same. This means that K2 must also grow at the same rate 
as K1 which implies that is fixed. 
The implication of ad valorem tax levied on imports of capital goods by LDC is to reduce the 
level of income per household but not the long-run growth rate. Lee carries out an econometric 
analysis in which he finds a correlation between growth rates and the share of imported capital 
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goods. This can be explained by the fact that tax on imported capital goods depresses the level 
of income. As I have discussed in this chapter, this is likely to show up as slow growth rates 
while "transition' takes place. But both the original model of Rebelo and the modified model 
of Lee predict that new equilibrium is reached instantaneously as capital is assumed be mobile 
between sectors. 
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Appendix B: Including labour in the investment good sector. 
One problem with specifying the production function of the investment good sector as 
Y= AK, is that if we interpret the model literally, no labour is employed in this sector. 8 This 
may be seen by some as a unrealistic assumption. However, the AK formulation of the capital 
goods sector can be interpreted as the simplification of the following model. 
Suppose that the production function for the investment good sector is linear in capital but 
each firm in this sector need to employ a fixed amount of labour not related to the quantity of 
output produced. Thus, the model has increasing returns in capital. 
As before, the production functions are given by Y= Kali -a i=1,2 for the two 
consumption goods sectors and Y3 = AK for the capital goods sector. Suppose that each firm 
in the capital good sector needs to employ one unit of labour to produce positive output . 
Let 
m denote the number of firms producing capital goods. To simplify, I will assume that the 
firms are identical and produces the same amount of output, denoted by x. Then the aggregate 
supply of capital goods will be equal to mx. The cost function for each firm is then given by 
C=w+ 
Äq (2.26) 
=w+ 
RY3q 
. 
(2.27) 
m 
where R denotes the rental price and q denote the price of capital goods as before. Thus, given 
the demand and the price of the investment goods, the number of firms, m is determined. The 
amount of labour employed in the capital goods sector, denoted by L3 is equal to m. 
In the absence of tax, the average cost is equal to the price; C/x = q. Hence we have the 
following relationship: 
q(l -R A 
(2.28) 
This economy grows in exactly the same way as the original model. Let n denote the growth 
rate of labour so that 
Li 
Li 
(2.29) 
ýIn Rebelo (1991), an alternative formulation is provided which assumes that K is a composite of both physical 
and human capital. 
54 
The growth rate of capital is then given by 
KZ 
KZ =A-(P+b)+n, (2.30) 
The number of the firms in the investment good sector grows at the same rate as the growth 
of labour. The quantity each firm produces grows at the rate A-p-b. The wage grows at 
the rate a(A -p- b). It is easy to see that these growth rates will satisfy the relationship in 
(2.28). Therefore the balance growth rate in the original model is consistent with this modified 
model. 
Admittedly, the micro-foundation for this specification is weak. I have simply assumed that 
all firms are identical. Given that technology exhibits increasing returns, this is not a trivial 
issue. Although a similar structure is used in the model of Salop (1979), further work is needed 
to provide a more sound microfoundation for this type of models. 
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Chapter 3 
Capital Accumulation and the Total 
Factor Productivity Growth of East 
Asian Economies 
3.1 Introduction 
Growth experience of the East Asian economies is characterised by the rapid accumulation of 
capital over the past few decades prior to the financial crises in the mid-1990s. At the same 
time, a number of growth accounting studies have shown that total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth in these economies has been slower than expected. The most well-known among those 
are Young (1994,1995) and Collins and Bosworth (1996). In this study, I will argue that 
this puzzling finding is due to mismeasurements of TFP residuals rather than actual under- 
performance of these economies with regard to technological progress. It is shown that two 
important aspects of East Asian growth, namely very high rates of investment and importing 
of capital goods, have both contributed to understating the measured TFP growth. 
The finding in those growth accounting studies show that TFP growth rates in East Asia are 
modest in comparison with other countries, especially the industrialised economies. By applying 
the vintage models of economic growth. I will argue that two particular characteristics of East 
Asian economies, import of capital goods and rapid accumulation of capital, have contributed 
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to understating their TFP growth rates. 
The vintage models differentiate capital by the date of its construction. There are two 
strands of the vintage models. It turns out that each of these models identifies a source of 
mismeasurement in standard growth accounting methodology. 
The first strand of the vintage models focuses on the falling cost of capital goods relative 
to consumption goods. ' This type of the vintage model was first presented in Solow (1959) 
and sometimes referred to as the neo-classical vintage model. The implication of this model for 
growth accounting is that inputs of capital should not be adjusted for quality improvements. 
However, most data sets aim to represent "real" quantities and hence are adjusted for quality 
changes. In this case, TFP growth residuals are not meaningful measures and it is likely that 
they understate the real extent of technological progress, especially in capital goods importing 
countries. This point is discussed in Section 3.3. 
The second strand of the vintage models assumes Leontief technology. The key assumption 
of the model is that newer vintages of capital requires less labour for each unit of capital. The 
details of the model are discussed in Solow, Tobin, von Weizsäcker and Yaari (1966). The model 
presented in Section 3.4 is similar in spirit to this second strand of the vintage models. The 
model in this study assumes that substitution between labour and capital is possible but its 
range is limited. This model implies that growth of aggregate capital in use is constrained by 
the supply of labour and technology. When the rate of investment is high, a larger quantity 
of less productive capital is made obsolete. Hence, assuming a constant depreciation rate for 
capital could lead to mismeasurements in growth rates of capital. This hypothesis can account 
for the observed negative correlation between TFP growth rates and growth rates of capital. 
In Section 3.5, numerical simulations are used to examine the quantitative aspects of the 
model with endogenous retirement rate of capital. The results suggest that the size of mismea- 
surements can be significant. 
In Section 3.6, the results of growth accounting reported in Collins and Bosworth (1996) and 
Young (1995) are examined to see if they are consistent with the predictions of the model. A 
closer examination of the results of the growth accounting studies show a negative relationship 
between the observed TFP growth rates and the accumulation of capital. 
'This hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence. See Gordon (1990). 
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3.2 The meaning and importance of TFP residuals 
The interpretations of TFP residuals 
When discussing TFP residuals, it helps to be clear about the purpose of measuring TFP 
growth. The importance of TFP growth is in the fact that it is an indicator of the long- 
run growth prospect. This point can be illustrated with the following simple Cobb-Douglas 
production function: 
Y(t) = AýtýKaLl-a (3.1) 
where Y(t) is output, A(t) is the index of technology, K and L are inputs of capital and 
labour respectively. Given this production function, growth of output can be decomposed into 
technological improvements and growth in inputs: 
A+aK+(1-a)L. 
(3.2) 
YAKL 
Growth in output, capital input and labour input can be measured directly while it is not 
possible to quantify the rate of technological progress directly. However, the relationship in 
(3.2) allows the rate of technological progress to be deduced from the observable quantities. 
Let (D(t) denote the TFP residual at time t. TFP residuals are defined as follows: 
(D(t)=Y-ak_(1-a)L YKL 
(3.3) 
If the model in (3.1) is correct and the data are accurate, then the TFP residuals are equal 
to the rate of improvements in technology. In practice, we cannot be sure that TFP residuals 
are entirely due to technological progress. TFP residuals are sometimes referred to as "a 
measure of ignorance" for this reason. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the cause 
of the discrepancy between growth in output and growth in measurable inputs is likely to be 
technological progress in the absence of other explanations. Some authors suggest that the 
importance of TFP residuals is in the fact that we do not know the exact explanation for 
finding these residuals. 2 But this argument misses the point. By measuring TFP residuals, we 
are trying to quantify the technological progress taking place in the economy. 
2The argument in Hulten (1992) seems to imply this. 
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This point becomes most apparent when we consider the balanced growth rate. The bal- 
anced growth path for the model in (3.1) is such that growth in income per capita is given 
by 
Y L-(l 
la)Aý (3.4) 
The long-run growth rate in income per capita is linear in the rate of improvements in technol- 
ogy. Therefore, the TFP growth rate is an indicator of the economy's long-run growth prospect. 
If there is no technological progress, growth in per capita income eventually comes to a halt as 
neoclassical production functions exhibit diminishing returns in capital. 
For the model like (3.1), it simple to define what mismeasurements are. If the measured 
TFP residuals differ from the actual growth in the parameter A(t), it can be said that this 
is a mismeasurement. However, as we will see later, when technology is embodied in capital 
goods, the issue is not so straightforward. Therefore, I will rather loosely define the term 
"mismeasurement" to mean that TFP residuals obtained in growth accounting exercises do not 
reflect the economy's long-run growth prospect. 
Growth accounting studies for East Asian economies 
A number of growth accounting studies have shown that the TFP growth rates in East Asian 
economies over the past few decades have been modest. One of the early studies to examine the 
performance of East Asian economies' productivity growth is Young (1994). An econometric 
method was used to compare the TFP growth of 118 economies and examine the relative 
performance of the four East Asian economies (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan). 
The results show that even though Hong Kong has achieved one of the fastest TFP growth, the 
other three, especially Singapore, are much lower in the ranking. 
Following on the first study, Young (1995) provides a more detailed analysis of factor ac- 
cumulation and productivity growth in these four economies, and confirms that the conclusion 
of the earlier study. Much of the impressive growth in those East Asian economies can be at- 
tributed to the increased participation of labour, to rises in educational standards and to capital 
accumulation. The role technological progress has played in the growth of these economies is 
modest and comparable to those of OECD economies. 3 
'1Young's estimates are 2.3% for Hong Kong, 0.2% for Singapore, 1.7% for South Korea and 2.6% for Taiwan. 
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More comprehensive analysis is carried out in Collins and Bosworth (1996). Their study 
examines seven Asian economies in detail (Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand). Their findings largely confirm the results of Young. Taken 
as a region, TFP growth contributed only one-fourth of the per capita growth in East Asia over 
the past three decades. Even though East Asia has performed better than some of the other 
developing regions such as Africa, Middle East and Latin America, it has not done much better 
than the industrialised economies excluding the United States. 
Many economists have argued that these economies have had opportunities to catch up with 
industrialised economies in terms of technology but failed to take advantage of them. Thus, they 
concluded that East Asian economies have been less successful in adopting advanced technology. 
However, the theoretical expectations for such catching-up process to take place is not as clear 
as they might first appear. 
Theoretical expectations 
Many authors have found the findings in these growth accounting studies puzzling. The un- 
derlying assumption in their argument is that there are differences in the technological level 
between industrialised economies and less developed East Asian economies. The increased vol- 
ume of trade between these economies is likely to provide more opportunities for cross-border 
knowledge dissemination. 4 Even if technology is proprietary and excludable, the firms in less de- 
veloped countries should be able to imitate technology developed in industrialised economies at 
lower costs. Another channel for technology dissemination is that trade allows less developed 
economies to import technology and capital goods from technologically advanced countries. 
Moreover, there has been large inflows of foreign direct investment into the region. It is often 
the case that foreign direct investment by firms based in the industrialised economies brings not 
only capital but also technical expertise. Hence, it is argued that technologically less advanced 
East Asian economies should have performed better than industrialised economies in terms of 
the rate of technological progress. 
The crucial assumption is that East Asian economies were technologically less advanced at 
least when these economies started to grow rapidly. As I have argued in the previous chapter, 
'For the empirical studies on knowledge dissemination, see Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe, Helpman and 
Hoffmaister (1997). The validity of the findings in the former is questioned in Keller (1998). 
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this assumption about differences in technology is not so obvious. It is likely that there are 
some differences in the level of technology even today, the scale of such differences many not be 
as wide as implied by these authors. If broadly similar technologies are available to all countries 
in the first place, then there is less room for catching-up in total factor productivity to take 
place. 
However, in the case of East Asian economies, we should expect a faster TFP growth for 
the following reason. It is apparent that part of technological progress is due to improvements 
in the quality of investment goods. This idea is known as the embodiment hypothesis. When 
this is the case, rapid accumulation of capital should result in greater TFP residuals. However, 
growth accounting studies show that contrary to such expectations, TFP growth is slower when 
the rate of investment is high. Thus, although there are questions over the argument based on 
"catching-up process", the results of these growth accounting studies do present a puzzle all 
the same. 
It is worth considering why many authors have assumed that there is a large room for 
catching-up process to take place. One of the reasons is that the methods of production used 
in developed economies and less developed economies are clearly different. As I have discussed 
in Chapter 1, however, it does not necessarily follow that technology is much inferior in less 
developed countries. 
Another reason for expecting faster TFP growth in East Asia seems to be that there is a his- 
torical precedence for apparent "catching-up" taking place. Maddison (1987) reports the TFP 
growth rates of six industrialised economies for the post-war period. Among those economies, 
the TFP growth rates of four economies (France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands) for the 
period 1950-73 were clearly higher than those of the United Stats and the United Kingdom. 
Maddison concludes that one of the reasons for this gap is that the process of catching-up took 
place. 
The model examined in this study questions this conclusion. It will be shown that the 
vintage model can potentially explain both modest TFP growth in East Asia and the appar- 
ent catching-up process in industrialised economies after the Second World War in terms of 
mismeasurements. 
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3.3 The vintage model and quality adjustments for capital 
In recent years, the difficulty of adjusting output for quality improvements has been highlighted, 
especially in relation to the rapid progress made in information technology. If the aim of 
constructing the data is to measure growth in real GDP, for example, then it is natural to 
adjust output to take quality improvements into account. However, if the aim is to measure 
TFP growth and hence long-run growth prospect, the data for capital goods should not be 
adjusted for quality improvements. Using adjusted data for measuring TFP residuals is likely 
to result in understating technological progress especially in capital goods importing economies. 
Consider the standard vintage model discussed in Solow (1959). Most data sets for output 
attempt to measure the change in real terms. Hence, the quantities are adjusted to allow for 
quality improvements. Some authors such as Hulten (1992) argue that the measurement of the 
capital goods as well as consumption goods should be adjusted for improvements in quality. 
The reason for making the adjusting is that "the failure to adjust capital for quality change 
when such change is actually occurring has the effect of suppressing the quality effects into the 
conventional total-factor-productivity residual". The point seems to be that it is undesirable to 
include the effects of what we know (quality improvements in capital goods) in TFP residuals. 
This reasoning misses the point of measuring TFP residuals discussed earlier. The importance 
of TFP growth is that it is an indicator of the economy's growth prospect. 
To illustrate the point, consider the vintage model of Solow (1959): 
Y(t) = A(t)J(t)`YL(t)1-`x, (3.5) 
where Y(t) is output, A(t) is the index for disembodied form of technology, J(t) is effective 
capital and L(t) is input of labour. Assume that the economy is closed. Output is used for 
either consumption (C) or investment (I) so that Y=I+C. Effective capital is given by the 
sum of past investment taking quality improvements in capital goods into account: 
t 
J(t) =l BZIZe-6(t-2) di, (3.6) 
where B(i) is the index of technology embodied in capital goods and 6 denotes the constant rate 
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of physical depreciation. Note that output, Y, does not take quality improvements in newly 
produced capital goods. 
First, suppose data is not adjusted for quality improvements in capital goods. In this case, 
the capital stock at time t is given by 
t 
K(t) =f 
Oc 
IZe-b(t-2) di. (3.7) 
Let 'K denote the TFP residuals obtained by growth accounting using unadjusted data. TFP 
residuals are given by 
ýx =Y- Cf 
k- 
(1 - a) -L (3.8) YK 
AJK 
_+aJK (3.9) 
Let A and µ represent the exogenously given growth rates of the indices A(t) and B(t) respec- 
tively. Then the balanced growth rate of income per capita is given by (A + aµ) (1 - cr). TFP 
residuals for the economy on the balanced growth path is 'K =A+ cßµ. Thus, TFP growth 
does indicate what the long-run growth rate of income per capita is. 
Suppose on the other hand that capital is adjusted for quality improvements. Let Q(t) 
denote a measure of output which is adjusted quality improvements in capital goods: 
Q(t) = C(t) + B(t)I(t). 
Let 4j denote TFP residuals obtained by using adjusted data. The growth of quality adjusted 
output of the economy on a balanced growth path is given by 
Q= 
[1 - 07(t)] 
C+ 
a(t) 
I+B, 
(3.10) 
CIB 
=Y Y 
+a 
B. 
(3.11) 
where cr(t) represents the share of investment goods in output; a(t) = B(t)I(t)/Q(t). Note that 
when the economy grows at the balanced growth rate, the share of capital goods in output, 
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a(t), is increasing and eventually approaches one. If we use the standard growth accounting 
methodology with the data adjusted for quality, then TFP residuals for the economy on a 
balanced growth path are given by 
Q 
-a (3.12) QJL 
=A0B. (3.13) B 
It is evident that Ij is not a meaningful measure since the share of investment goods ar(t) 
has no relevance to the long-run growth rate. Although the share of investment goods cr(t) 
is likely to be increasing, most data sets show it to be less than the income share of capital, 
a. It follows that the TFP growth rate obtained from quality adjusted date is smaller than 
the correct TFP growth rate; 1) J< (1) K. Moreover, for the economy which imports capital 
goods and export consumption goods, a(t) is even smaller. If all capital goods are imported, 
a will be zero. In this case, TFP residuals obtained with quality adjusted data do not take 
account of any quality improvements of imported capital goods. Therefore, TFP growth rate of 
capital-goods importing East Asian economies may well look modest when compared with those 
of industrialised economies which export capital goods. But such a comparison is meaningless 
and has little relevance to the actual technological progress and the long-run growth prospect 
of each region. 
3.4 Models with Limited Substitutability 
In this section, it is shown that if the substitution possibilities between labour and capital are 
limited, then the retirement rate of capital is determined endogenously by increases in wages. 
When investment grows at a rate higher than the long-run growth rate, a larger proportion of 
the existing capital stock is made obsolete. Growth accounting usually uses the perpetual in- 
ventory method for estimating the capital stock and assumes that the retirement rate of capital 
is constant. This assumption results in overstating growth of capital input when investment 
rate is greater than the long-run rate. Overstating growth of capital in turn reduces TFP resid- 
uals. Hence, the model can explain the observed negative correlation between conventionally 
64 
estimated growth in capital and measured TFP residuals. 
The model is similar in spirit to the vintage model in Solow, Tobin, von Weizsäcker and Yaari 
(1966). The vintage model in Solow (1959) assumes that the feasible range of the capital to 
labour ratio has no upper bound. Competitive firms will employ less labour to work with older 
and less productive capital allowing capital to be in use indefinitely. This is clearly contrary 
to casual observations. We observe that older machinery is taken out of use and replaced with 
new machinery even if it is still in a perfect working condition. This can be explained if there is 
a limit on the range of the capital to labour ratio. 5 The model used in this section incorporates 
this limitation by assuming that there is a minimum amount of labour needed to operate each 
vintage of capital. Unlike the model of Solow et al (1966), substitution between labour and 
capital is possible within a limited range. This model is used rather than the model of Solow 
et al (1966) so that the implications of the model for TFP residuals with those of the standard 
neoclassical production function can be compared in a meaningful way. 
The model assumes that there is a minimum amount of labour that needs to be employed to 
work with each machinery. If the amount of labour employed were to fall below this minimum, 
output would be zero. Hence, production using a less productive vintage shuts down when the 
value of its output becomes less than the cost of employing the required minimum amount of 
labour. Let Y(t) denote output from production which employs capital of vintage i at time t. 
The production function is given by 
A(t)XaLi -a 
Y 
if Xi/Li < ii, (3.14) = 
0 if XZ/Li > 772. 
This specification implies that each unit of capital Xi requires at least 1/rji unit of labour 
to operate. I will refer to the increases in the parameter rji as "labour saving technological 
progress". It is assumed that 77i grows at a constant rate t: 
%i=ij0eL2 
"One worker cannot use a hundred shovels and hope to compete with a man on a bulldozer. A worker with 
ten typewriters cannot compete with a worker with the latest word processor and so on. 
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Note that the disembodied form of the technology A(t) applies to all vintages. It turn out that 
for the economy to have a balanced growth path, the rates of technological progress are such 
that 
A 
A rý 
I assume that the two types of technological progress are related in this way. Although this is 
not a satisfactory assumption, it plays little role in the main argument made in this study. 
Labour is assumed to be mobile within the economy which implies that the marginal product 
of labour needs to be the same across vintages. Let w(t) denote the wage rate at time t measured 
in units of output. The revenue from output must at least cover the cost of employing labour. 
Hence the following relationship must hold for all vintages in use: 
A(t)X'L2-Ce > w(t)L2. (3.15) 
The constraint in (3.14) can be rewritten as 
Y (t) = 
A(t)XaL2 -a if rya > w(t), (3.16) 
0 if rya < w(t). 
Let m(t) denote the maximum age of capital at time t. For the oldest vintage in use, the 
revenue from output is just enough to cover the cost of the minimum amount of labour required: 
Tice ,,,,,, (t) = w(t). 
(3.17) 
The aggregate output at time t, denoted by Y(t), is given by 
It 
Y(t) = 
It-m(t) 
Y (t) di. (3.18) 
Solow (1959) shows that the aggregate production function can be written as 
Y(t) = K(t)L(t)l-'; (3.19) 
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where 
K(t) =J Xi di, (3.20) 
m(t) t it, 
and 
L(t) = 
it 
- 
Li (t) di. 
tm 
(t) 
Suppose that the supply of labour also grows at a constant rate, n. It is easy to show that 
output grows at the rate c+n on a balanced growth rate. The wage rate grows at the rate t. 
The growth of the capital stock at time t can be obtained by differentiating (3.20), which gives 
K(t) = Xt - (1 - 7fl(t))Xt-m(t)" (3.21) 
Evidently, if investment grows at the rate greater than the long-run rate, wages also rise faster. 
In this situation, the constraint in (3.16) implies that the maximum age of capital in use is made 
shorter and a greater amount of capital is taken out of production. Hence, the growth rate of 
the capital stock in use is not as large as estimated by the perpetual inventory method. This 
discrepancy in the actual and estimated growth rates of capital could lead to understatement 
of TFP residuals when capital is accumulated rapidly. 
Thus, we have identified a second source of mismeasurement. In this section, we have 
started from a reasonable assumption that capital to labour ratio for older machinery cannot 
be increased indefinitely. Then it is shown that this limitation can lead to mismeasurements 
of the capital stock. In this case, mismeasurements are such that they occur when the level 
of investment is high. Therefore, the model can potentially explain the negative correlation 
between growth in capital and TFP growth. 
In the next section, numerical examples are used to assess if the possible effects of mismea- 
surements are large enough to affect growth accounts significantly. 
3.5 Simulation results 
The analysis so far has shown that the actual growth rate capital in use may differ from the 
rate estimated by the perpetual inventory method. It is likely that the technological progress 
for the aggregate economy is fairly stable over time. If this is the case, one would theoretically 
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expect a negative correlation between (conventionally measured) TFP residuals and the rate of 
capital accumulation. IIn fact, this is what the results in the growth accounting studies show. 
However, if we are to argue that the observed negative correlation is due to mismeasure- 
ments, we need to demonstrate that the scale of mismeasurements are large enough to affect 
measured TFP residuals significantly. The purpose of this section is to examine the possible 
size of mismeasurements using numerical simulations. 
Suppose that the model with the limited substitution possibilities is the "correct" model 
and the retirement rate of capital is determined endogenously as described in the last section. 
However, growth accounts are constructed using the perpetual inventory method assuming a 
constant depreciation rate for capital. Then the estimate of the capital stock will be different 
from the actual capital stock in use if the economy is not on the balanced growth path. The 
numerical experiments in this section aim to measure how large the resulting mismeasurements 
might be using a plausible set of parameters. 
The numerical simulations are carried out as follows. Given the purpose of this simulation, 
I will use a highly stylised model. The level of investment over time is artificially constructed 
and this is treated as given. Then we can obtain two estimates of the capita stock in use using 
this investment series. One is the "incorrect" estimate that is obtained by using the perpetual 
inventory model. The other is the "correct" estimates (by assumption) which are obtained 
using the model developed in the last section. We compare these two estimates of capital to 
examine the size of mismeasurements and its effect of TFP residuals. 
The supply of labour is assumed to grow at a constant rate n. Technological progress takes 
at a constant rate t. Initially the economy is assumed to be on a balanced growth path so 
that investment grows at the rate i. + n. Then at time to, investment jumps to a higher level. 
Thereafter, growth rate of investment falls back to the balanced growth rate . 
This change of 
investment rate is depicted in Figure 3-1. If the capital stock is estimated by the perpetual 
inventory method, then the change in the growth rates of the capital stock would be as shown 
in Figure 3-2. At time to growth of capital jumps to a higher level and then gradually falls back 
to the balanced growth rate. 
The parameters needed to describe the model are the labour growth rate, the rate of tech- 
nological progress and the initial maximum age of capital at time to. Prior to to, the investment 
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Investm ent 
Figure 3-1: Change in the level of investment 
Growth rate of K 
Figure 3-2: Growth rate of capital 
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to tim e 
to time 
rate is on a balanced growth rate and hence the maximum age of the capital in use is constant. 
After time to, however, the maximum age is shortened due the increased demand for labour as 
a result of increased investment. 
The actual growth rate of capital in use implied by the model is obtained as follows. The 
maximum age at time to, m(to), is assumed to be 20 or 25 years. Finally, the parameter for 
technology needs to be scaled so that the maximum age of capital in the model is as it is 
assumed. This can be done by using the relationship in (3.17): 
a 
to Xi di a 
(3.22 77to 
_m(to) - 
(1 - a) L1t0_m(t0) L(to) 
Since the rate of technological progress, t, is assumed to be given, the value of 77i for other 
years can be obtained. The prevailing wage rate and the parameter 77i determined the range of 
capital in use. 
The actual history of investment is obviously more complicated than what is assumed in 
these simulations. Different types of capital would have different maximum ages and different 
rates of technological progress. The purpose of the experiments in this section is simple to show 
that this theoretical possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
Simulation 1 
Simulation 1 is used as the benchmark case. In this example, I will consider a case in which 
the average growth rate of capital approximately doubles after to. The annual growth rates 
of labour and technological progress are assumed to be 0.02 and 0.03 respectively. Hence the 
balanced growth rate of investment, denoted by gi, is 0.05. At to, investment increases by 
150growth rate of investment falls back to the balanced growth rate. This has the effect of 
increasing the average growth rate of capital (as measured by the perpetual inventory method) 
for the period 10 years after to to 11% from the balanced growth rate of 5%. The results of this 
simulation are reported in Table 3.1. 
The figures are the average of annual rates over the ten-year period. The effect on TFP 
residuals is obtained by multiplying the difference between actual growth rate of and estimated 
rate by the factor share of capital a, which is assumed to be 1/3. In Simulation 1, the negative 
effects of mismeasurements are 0.8% for the first 10 years and 0.5% for the next 10 years. These 
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Table 3.1: Simulation 1 
gi = 0.05 
n=0.02 
c=0.03 
m(to) = 25 
Actual growth of K Estimated growth of K Effects on TFP residuals 
Prior to to 0.05 0.05 0 
Between to and t10 0.0879 0.1124 -0.0082 
Between t10 and t20 0.0501 0.0664 -0.0054 
The maximum age is in years. All other figures are in annual growth rates. 
effects are significant in comparison with the commonly observed TFP growth rates. Therefore, 
although this is a crude experiment, this example confirms the theoretical possibility pointed 
out in the last section could have significant effects on the results of growth accounting. 
In the other three examples, the values of the parameters are varied to investigate the effects 
of mismeasurements further. 
Simulation 2 
In the second simulation, the maximum age of capital at time to is changed from 25 years to 
20 years. The other parameters are the same as Simulation 1. The results are reported in 
Table 3.2. The negative effects of mismeasurements are 1.0% for the first 10 years and 0.6% for 
the next 10 years. 
When the maximum age is shorter, the effects of mismeasurements are larger. When capital 
turning obsolete is newer, there is a relative more quantity of it in relation to the total capital 
stock in used since the balanced growth is assumed for the period before time to. Hence, if the 
maximum age at the time investment increases to above the balanced growth level is shorter, 
the magnitude of mismeasurements is larger. 
Simulation 3 
In Simulation 3, the annual growth rate of labour supply is assumed to be 1% and hence the 
balanced growth rate of investment is changed to 4%. Other parameters are the same as in 
Simulation 1. The results are reported in Table 3.3. The negative effects of mismeasurements 
are 0.9% for the first 10 years and 0.5% for the next 10 years. 
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Table 3.2: Simulation 2 
gI=0.05 
n=0.02 
t=0.03 
m(to) = 20 
Actual growth of K Estimated growth of K Effects on TFP residuals 
Prior to to 0.05 0.05 0 
Between to and tlo 0.0797 0.1125 -0.0109 
Between t10 and t20 0.0488 0.0664 -0.0059 
The maximum age is in years. All other figures are in annual growth rates. 
Table 3.3: Simulation 3 
gI=0.04 
n=0.01 
t=0.03 
m(to) = 25 
Actual growth of K Estimated growth of K Effects on TFP residuals 
Prior to to 0.04 0.04 0 
Between to and t10 0.0741 0.1005 -0.0088 
Between tlo and t20 0.0416 0.0579 -0.0054 
The maximum age is in years. All other figures are in annual growth rates. 
When the supply of labour grows slowly in relation to the increase in capital stock, increases 
in wages will be faster. If the growth rate in wages is higher, more capital is made obsolete. 
The slight increase in the effect of mismeasurement in comparison with Simulation 1 is for this 
reason. 
Simulation 4 
In Simulation 4, the annual growth rate of technology is assumed to be 2% and the growth rate 
of labour is assumed to be 2% as before. Hence the balanced growth rate of investment is 4%. 
The results are summarised in Table 3.4. The negative effects of mismeasurements are 1.1 % 
for the first 10 years and 0.6% for the next 10 years. 
The results show that the effects of mismeasurements are greater than the case in which 
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Table 3.4: Simulation 4 
gI=0.04 
n=0.02 
t=0.02 
m(to) = 25 
Actual growth of K Estimated growth of K Effects on TFP residuals 
Prior to to 0.04 0.04 0 
Between to and t10 0.0675 0.0992 -0.0106 
Between tlo and t20 0.0396 0.0579 -0.0061 
The maximum age is in years. All other figures are in annual growth rates. 
the rate of technological progress is lower. This is explained by the fact that slower rate of 
technological progress means that more capital needs to be made obsolete to accommodate the 
increases in wages. 
Varying the values of the parameters will lead to changes in the size of mismeasurements. 
It is clear, however, that if the model is correct, then using the perpetual inventory method 
to estimate the capital stock leads to quantitatively significant mismeasurements. Although 
detailed modelling of the actual economies are beyond the scope of this study, the results in 
this section show that the effect mismeasurements is a possible explanation for the negative 
correlation between growth of capital and TFP growth. 
3.6 Evidence from the results of growth accounting studies 
The model predicts that when there is a large amount of new investment relative to growth 
of labour, the perpetual inventory method overstates growth of the capital stock and hence 
understates the TFP growth rates. If the actual rate of technological progress is stable over 
time, we expect a negative correlation between the observed TFP growth and the growth in 
per capita physical capital. In this section, I will plot the observed TFP growth rates and the 
estimated growth rates of capital to see if there are discernible patterns. 6 It turns out that the 
results reported in Young (1995) and Collins and Bosworth (1996) are largely consistent with 
'' Given the nature of analysis, detailed statistical analysis seems to be of little value. 
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this prediction of the model. 
Before discussing the results in Young (1995), it is worth noting the method of estimating 
the capital stock at the beginning of the data series for investment. Young estimates the 
capital stock using the standard perpetual inventory method which requires an estimate of the 
capital stock at the beginning of the series. He considers the capital stock reported in various 
surveys inadequate. Therefore, Young initialises the capital stock series by assuming that the 
growth rate of investment in the first five years of the investment series is representative of the 
investment growth prior to the beginning of the series. Young recognises that this method is 
fairly crude and therefore focuses his analysis on the post-1966 period to leave enough time after 
the beginning of the series. Therefore, I similarly discard the results for the period before 1966. 
Moreover, Young comments on Singapore that "Given the IIP's questionable (i. e., non-existent) 
deflators, these estimates are clearly inaccurate". Therefore, I will not include the results for 
Singapore in the analysis. 
The annual TFP growth rates are plotted against the difference in the growth rates of labour 
and capital. For Hong Kong, Young considers only the aggregate economy. The number of the 
observations are admittedly few but Figure 3-3 shows a clear negative relationship between the 
TFP growth rates and the growth rates in the per capita capital. It is noted that if we include 
the period 61-66, this period turns out to be a clear outlier. 
For South Korea, the economy is disaggregated into Manufacturing, Other Industries and 
Services. There is a clear negative relationship in the growth rates of TFP and the per capita 
capital stock as shown in Figure 3-4. The Taiwanese economy is also disaggregated into the 
same three categories. The relationship in Taiwan is less clear as can be seen in Figure 3-5. 
Thus, the findings in Young's growth accounting are consistent with the hypothesis that 
the rate of technological progress has been stable and the variations in TFP residuals are due 
to the errors in estimating the capital stock. 
In Collins and Bosworth, the results for only three periods are reported for each economy. 
In most cases, the pattern follows the predictions of the model. When the growth in the 
per capita capital growth is greater, TFP growth rates tend to be lower. It is evident that 
what is depressing the average TFP growth rate of East Asian economies over the period from 
1960 to 1994 is the particularly slow growth phase between 1973 and 1984. However, this 
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Table 3.5: Annual Growth Rates in Hong Kong 
Capital (1) Labour (2) (1)-(2) TFP 
61- 66 0.169 0.032 0.137 0.035 
66- 71 0.075 0.025 0.05 0.023 
71- 76 0.075 0.033 0.042 0.039 
76- 81 0.093 0.051 0.042 0.022 
81- 86 0.078 0.019 0.059 0.009 
86-91 0.062 0.005 0.057 0.024 
Source: Young (1995, TABLE V) 
Growth rates of the per capita capital is given by (1)-(2). 
Table 3.6: Annual Growth Rates in South Korea 
Capital (1) Labour (2) (1)-(2) TFP 
Manufacturing: 
60-66 0.105 0.115 -0.01 0.013 
66-70 0.205 0.104 0.101 0.048 
71-75 0.133 0.084 0.049 0.053 
75-80 0.207 0.047 0.16 -0.007 
81-85 0.075 0.019 0.056 0.051 
85-90 0.147 0.069 0.078 0.008 
Other industry: 
60-66 0.188 0.082 0.106 -0.012 
66-70 0.258 0.165 0.093 -0.033 
71-75 0.104 0.006 0.098 0.028 
75-80 0.180 0.051 0.129 0.010 
81-85 0.131 0.051 0.080 0.014 
85-90 0.058 0.040 0.018 0.066 
Service: 
60-66 0.052 0.040 0.012 0.007 
66-70 0.142 0.079 0.063 0.014 
71-75 0.124 0.043 0.081 0.022 
75-80 0.14 0.033 0.107 0.009 
81-85 0.107 0.034 0.073 0.016 
85-90 0.096 0.060 0.036 0.025 
Source: Young (1995, TABLE VII) 
Growth rates of the per capita capital is given by (1)-(2). 
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Table 3.7: Annual Growth Rates in Taiwan 
Capital (1) Labour (2) (1)-(2) TFP 
Manufacturing: 
60-70 0.207 0.078 0.129 0.031 
70-80 0.145 0.100 0.045 0.001 
80-90 0.078 0.012 0.066 0.028 
Other industry: 
60-70 0.177 0.100 0.077 -0.020 
70-80 0.165 0.063 0.102 0.013 
80-90 0.058 0.012 0.046 0.027 
Service: 
66-70 0.145 0.018 0.127 0.040 
70-80 0.134 0.049 0.085 0.029 
80-90 0.094 0.036 0.058 0.039 
Source: Young (1995, TABLE VIII) 
Growth rates of the per capita capital is given by (1)-(2). 
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period coincides with the time in which capital per worker grew (as estimated 
by the perpetual 
inventory method) fast. Therefore, it seems likely that mismeasurements of the capital stock 
has played a role in the finding that TFP growth in East Asia has been modest. 
The model can also provide a potential explanation for the fast TFP growth rates observed 
in some of the industrialised countries after the Second World War. Maddison (1987) provides a 
detailed growth accounting study for six industrialised economies. The methodology is different 
from that of Collins and Bosworth and therefore simple comparisons are not helpful. But a 
number of interesting observations can be made. Apart from the United States, TFP growth 
rates in industrialised economies were significantly higher in the period 1950-73. Four of the 
six economies, France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands experienced especially high TFP 
growth while the TFP growth rates of the other two were more modest. Maddison attempts 
to explain TFP growth in terms of nine supplementary factors such as changes in economic 
structure and the effects of catching-up. 
The model with endogenous retirement rate of capital presented in this study also offers a 
simple explanation for faster TFP growth in the period immediately after the Second World 
War. Maddison quotes the war damage to the fixed capital stock from various sources. These 
figures are reproduced in Table 3.9. 
It shows that the damage was much larger in the four economies which experienced very 
high TFP growth in the period 1950-73. This is consistent with the predictions of the model. 
If a large amount of capital is removed from the economy, then the technological constraint 
that causes older capital to turn obsolete ceases to bind until enough capital is accumulated. 
When the constraint is not binding, no capital is made to retire apart from those due to wear 
and tear. Therefore, the actual retirement rate would be low and assuming a constant rate 
of physical depreciation for the capital stock results in understating the growth of the capital 
stock and hence overstating the observed TFP growth rates. 
The effect of war damage may also explain another puzzle mentioned in Collins and Bosworth. 
They find a modest correlation between TFP growth and growth of capital per worker (the sum 
of physical capital per worker and education per worker) before 1973 but finds no evidence of 
a relationship after 1973. Some of the industrial economies which had large war damage could 
have accumulated physical capital without causing more capital to retire since removal of capital 
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Table 3.8: Growth in physical capital per worker and TFP 
Country and period Physical capital per worker TFP 
Indonesia 
1960-73 0.9 1.1 
1973-84 3.3 0.5 
1984-94 2.3 0.9 
Korea 
1960-73 3.2 1.4 
1973-84 3.4 1.1 
1984-94 3.3 2.1 
Malaysia 
1960-73 2.4 1.0 
1973-84 2.7 0.4 
1984-94 1.8 1.4 
Philippines 
1960-73 1.3 0.7 
1973-84 2.0 -1.3 
1984-94 0.2 -0.9 
Singapore 
1960-73 4.6 0.9 
1973-84 3.1 1.0 
1984-94 2.3 3.1 
Thailand 
1960-73 3.2 1.4 
1973-84 2.0 1.1 
1984-94 2.6 3.3 
Taiwan 
1960-73 3.9 2.2 
1973-84 3.0 0.9 
1984-94 2.3 2.8 
Source: Collins and Bosworth (1996, Table 6). 
Figures are in percentage points per year. 
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Table 3.9: TFP growth and the war damage. 
Country War Damage (%) TFP Growth 
1913-50 1950-73 1973-84 
France 8 1.42 4.02 1.84 
Germany 13 0.86 4.32 1.55 
Japan 25.7 1.10 5.79 1.21 
Netherlands 15 1.25 3.35 0.81 
U. K. 3 1.15 2.14 1.22 
U. S. n. a. 1.99 1.85 0.52 
Source: Maddison (1987, Table 10 and Table 11) 
would lower the real wages allowing less efficient capital stock to be used longer. If a constant 
rate of depreciation is assumed, then it would have resulted in faster observed TFP growth for 
some years after the Second World War but as capital accumulation continued, the constraint 
on the capital to labour ratio would have began to bind again turning more capital obsolete. 
3.7 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, 1 have presented two hypothesis to account for slow TFP growth rates found 
in growth accounting studies for East Asian economies. 
The first is related to the nature of technological progress and the problems with constructing 
the data set. It is shown that inputs of capital should not be adjusted for quality improvements. 
Using real data is not appropriate for the purpose of growth accounting. An implication of the 
model is that this will understate the TFP residuals of capital-goods importing economies more 
than capital-goods exporting economies. Krugman argues that "If technology is embodied in 
capital, this can lead to an exaggeration of the `residual' component of growth. " This argument 
is correct only if the data set for capital inputs are not adjusted for quality improvements. 
Hence, when trade in capital goods plays an important role in accumulation of capital, a simple 
comparison of the TFP residuals for industrialised countries and less developed economies may 
be misleading. 
The second hypothesis is that new investment has the effect of replacing the old capital 
stock in which case assuming a constant rate of physical depreciation overstates the growth 
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of the capital stock in use. This hypothesis is motivated by the observation that there is a 
negative correlation between TFP growth rates and growth in capital per worker, contrary to 
the predictions of growth models. Perhaps this negative correlation is more puzzling than the 
apparent slow TFP growth in East Asia. The vintage model limited substitution possibilities 
can account for this puzzling finding. 
The overall conclusion from this study is that it is premature to conclude that technological 
progress in East Asia has been slow. In this study, I have attempted to show that there are 
enough grounds to doubt the findings in the growth accounting studies of East Asian economies. 
Although TFP growth is a important indicator, given the problems in measuring the relevant 
quantities, its results need to be interpreted with caution. 
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Chapter 4 
Open Regionalism 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that if two asymmetric countries agree to adopt a policy 
of open regionalism, such an arrangement may result in worsening the welfare of one economy 
while improving the other's. Furthermore, if the countries are not freely able to choose the 
partners for forming a trade bloc, some economies may have to accept welfare-worsening open 
regionalism as the least worst alternative. It is commonly thought that an open regionalism 
agreement is a "benign" form of regionalism and does not hinder the progress towards global 
free trade. The findings in this study are in sharp contrast to this conventional view. 
The emergence of regional trading blocs in recent years has raised the concern that such 
agreements are not only globally welfare-worsening but also prove to be an obstacle to fur- 
ther multilateral trade liberalization towards global free trade. ' Faced with such criticism, 
proponents of regional trade agreements point to the relative success of trade liberalization at 
regional levels in contrast to the slow pace of multilateral negotiation at the WTO. Moreover, 
some of them argue that the potential threats regional agreements pose for multilateral trade 
liberalization can be avoided to a large extent if the trade bloc adopts a non-discriminatory 
policy called "open regionalism". 
There is some confusion as to the exact meaning of the term "open regionalism". In this 
1 Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996). 
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study, open regionalism is defined as follows. A trade liberalization measure adopted by a 
regional bloc is in accord with open regionalism if it is non-discriminatory with regard to non- 
member countries. Given this definition, a number of different trade liberalization measures 
come under the label of open regionalism. This study focuses on the policy rule by which trade 
liberalization measures agreed within the bloc are unconditionally extended to cover trade 
with non-member countries. This policy is sometimes referred to as "unconditional MFN" and 
considered to be the purest form of open regionalism. 
Before preceding further, it is worth mentioning other regional trade agreements which could 
be described as open regionalism. First, trade blocs may adopt a limited form of unconditional 
MFN by which the member economies liberalize trade in selected sectors on an MFN basis. 2 
If the member economies dominate the world market in those selected sectors or transport 
costs allow only limited competition from non-member economies, liberalizing trade without 
reciprocal measures from non-member economies would have little further effects. Another 
interpretation is that of an "open membership" rule by which any outside economy wishing to 
join the bloc will be accepted provided that it satisfies the non-discriminatory entry criteria. 3 
In this study, the term "open regionalism" only refers to the policy of unconditional MFN. 
The advantages of open regionalism over PTAs 
There are two forms of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Countries participating in a free 
trade area (FTA) removes tariffs on imports from other member countries while retaining the 
right to set their own tariffs rates on imports from non-members. In a customs union (CU), 
countries set a common tariffs rates on imports from outside countries. Preferential trade 
agreements clearly violate the MFN principles. Open regionalism (OR) as defined above is 
clearly not a preferential trade agreement since it is non-discriminatory. Bergsten (1990) points 
out that unconditional MFN has a number of advantages over PTAs. 
First, it avoids the problem of trade diversion altogether. The concepts of "trade diversion" 
and "trade creation" have been central to the discussions of the relative merits of forming pref- 
erential trade areas. The members of a PTA gain from trade created by internal liberalization. 
However, setting discriminatory tariffs as a result of forming a PTA may give advantage to 
2Frankel and Wei (1995). 
3Open regionalism discussed in Yi (1996) is open membership. 
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less efficient producers based within the PTA over more efficient outside producers. Open re- 
gionalism does not involve introducing discriminatory trade barriers and therefore avoids trade 
diversion while allowing the countries to benefit from trade creation. 
The second advantage of open regionalism is that it would avoid the problem of "trade 
deflation" and the related issue of defining the rules of origin. This problem, which is specific to 
FTAs, arises when the member economies wish to impose different tariffs rates on imports from 
outside economies. From the policy maker's point of view, the advantage of FTA over CU is that 
each economy retains control on tariffs for imports from non-member countries. However, if the 
movement of goods among the member economies is completely free and transportation costs 
are small, then imports from non-member economies would enter the trade bloc through the 
member economy with the lowest tariff rate and then distributed to the other economies within 
the FTA. This is often referred to as trade deflation. If this is permitted, any tariffs higher 
than the lowest rate among the member countries would be ineffective. To avoid this problem, 
FTA agreements often stipulate the "rules of origin" to determine when goods qualify for tariff- 
free treatment. However, problems could easily arise as production of goods is increasingly 
globalised. For example, if a firm within the trade bloc is own by foreigners (of non-member 
countries), what is the origin of the firm's product? Or when goods produced within the trade 
bloc contains intermediate goods imported from non-member countries, does it qualify for tariff 
free treatment? As production becomes increasingly globalised, such arbitrary rules could prove 
to be a costly restriction for producers. Open regionalism is much simpler to administrate in 
this respect. 
The third advantage of open regionalism is its effect on the process of global trade liberaliza- 
tion. PTAs may give the member economies a welfare level greater than what they would obtain 
under global free trade at the expense of countries outside the PTA. If so, member countries of 
the PTA have little incentive to take part in the further multilateral trade liberalization. Thus, 
PTAs may turn out to be an obstacle to the goal of achieving global free trade. It is argued that 
since open regionalism does not provide the member countries any incentives to hinder the mul- 
tilateral liberalization, it cannot be an obstacle to multilateral trade liberalization. However, I 
will demonstrate in this study that this is not always the case. 
There are, however, disadvantages to open regionalism, too. Although open regionalism 
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does not reduce incentives to pursue multilateral trade liberalization for member countries, its 
consequences for non-member countries are different. The post-war trade liberalization process 
at the GATT/WTO has been negotiated on a reciprocity basis. Participating economies make 
"concessions" to remove trade barriers in certain areas in return for other participants at the 
negotiation doing likewise. Unconditional MFN means that the trade bloc is giving away this 
"leverage" without requiring reciprocal trade liberalization from non-member countries. Hence, 
unconditional MFN provide trading partners with the opportunity to "free-ride" on the benefits 
of market access while using tariffs to manipulate the terms of trade in their favour. Therefore, 
open regionalism policy may perversely slow down the process of trade liberalization. 
Despite the potential problem concerning the incentives for non-members, open regional- 
ism is regarded as a good practice according to this conventional view. The point about the 
disadvantage of open regionalism suggests that the trade bloc that adopts open regionalism 
policy is making unilateral concessions. In fact, whether or not open regionalism means making 
unilateral concessions partly depends on the motives for having tariffs on imports in the first 
place. 
The motives for protection 
The assessment of the relative merits of open regionalism policy depends on the reason for 
imposing tariffs in the first place. First, consider the case in which the economy is so small that 
a change in its demand for imports by use of tariffs has no impact on international prices. Tariffs 
are imposed because of mercantilist influence on the policy making process. Suppose that the 
influence of the producer lobbyists on policy making is such that trade liberalization at home 
requires opening of export markets in exchange. Then a policy maker may find it easier to sign 
up to an open regionalism agreement with a smaller subset of its trading partners (i. e. countries 
participating in the open regionalism agreement) rather than remove tariffs unilaterally. Even 
though tariffs are removed on all imports according to the open regionalism agreement, there 
are gains for producer lobbyists in the form of the opening up of other members' markets. 
In terms of the welfare, any trade liberalization is good for small economies provided that 
there are no other distortions in the economy. 4 Hence, adopting an unconditional MFN policy 
'As in standard models, welfare under consideration is determined by consumption bundles of homogeneous 
residents in the economy. The issue of distribution is left aside. 
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does not constitute making any concessions in terms of the economy's welfare. In this case, 
open regionalism can be interpreted as a policy device to achieve welfare improving trade 
liberalization at home. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that economies are large enough to have monopoly power in 
the goods market and tariffs are used to influence the terms of trade in their favour. In this 
case, removing the tariffs without reciprocal liberalization is likely to lead to a fall in welfare. 
Hence, unconditional MFN does often mean that the economies are making concessions. ` 
Most of the literature on this issue is concerned with the latter case. The proponents of 
open regionalism often talk of minimising the negative effect arising from the lack of reciprocal 
trade liberalization. The underlying premise is that countries that adopt open regionalism are 
making sacrifices for the sake of global good. This must imply that tariffs are assumed to be 
levied in the context of strategic trade policy interactions among economies. 
However, this argument neglects the possibility that some countries in the trade bloc may 
actually gain if the bloc adopts open regionalism policy. The aim of this study is to point out 
that if the economies in a trading bloc are asymmetric, some countries could obtain a higher 
welfare level than under other arrangements despite the fact that they are giving away the right 
to impose retaliatory tariffs. Furthermore, it is possible that some of the participants to open 
regionalism agreement obtain a higher welfare level than they would under global free trade. 
This can happen for the following reason. A commitment to open regionalism by member 
countries is likely to make non-member countries more aggressive in setting tariffs on imports 
from the countries adopting open regionalism. Tariffs carry external effects in that the resulting 
lower price benefits all other countries which import the goods. If the countries in the bloc are 
asymmetric, some countries may gain from this externality effect. Hence, open regionalism 
may serve the self-interest of some countries, contrary to the popular perception that they are 
making unilateral concessions for global good. Moreover, it will be shown that these countries 
that could gain from open regionalism may succeed in forcing other countries in the bloc to 
adopt open regionalism policy. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, 1 will discuss in detail 
5However, if the trade bloc is an FTA, the benefits from doing away with the rules of origin may be consid- 
erable, though. 
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Table 4.1: The patterns of trade 
Goods 
123 
A+-- 
Country B-+- 
C-+ 
how open regionalism policy may be motivated by self-interest, contrary to the conventional 
view. It is also shown that there are situations in which open regionalism policy is an equilibrium 
outcome. In Section 4.3, the model and procedures for numerical simulations are described. In 
Section 4.4, the results of simulations are discussed. The results show that open regionalism 
could dominate other possible outcomes. Concluding remarks are given in Section 4.5. 
4.2 Open regionalism and the external effects 
The results of this study are derived using numerical examples as the model is analytically 
intractable. However, the intuition behind those results is relatively easy to see. In this section, I 
will discuss the mechanism by which some countries could gain from joining an open regionalism 
agreement. 
Consider a pure exchange economy consisting of three countries. The countries are labelled 
A, B and C. There are three types of goods and they are numbered as good 1, good 2 and 
good 3. The patterns of endowments are such that in equilibrium each country exports one 
good while importing the other two goods. Goods are labelled so that the export of country 
A is good 1, the export of country B is good 2 and the export of country C is good 3. The 
pattern of trade is shown in Table 4.1 where a "+" sign indicates that the country is exporting 
the good while the "-" sign shows that the country is importing the good. 
Countries are large enough to influence the international prices by use of tariffs. Countries 
may set tariffs individually or coordinate the policy by forming a trade bloc with others. Suppose 
that country A and B agree to adopt open regionalism policy. In this three-country model, an 
open regionalism agreement amounts to removal of tariffs by countries A and B irrespective of 
the actions taken by country C. In many situation, this open regionalism policy would give 
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countries A and Ba lower welfare level than they could obtain by forming a PTA and levy 
tariffs on imports from country C. In some cases, however, an open regionalism agreement 
gives a higher welfare level than PTAs to one of the countries participating in the agreement. 
To see the mechanism by which one of the countries gains from joining in an open regionalism 
agreement, suppose that country B obtains a higher welfare level with an open regionalism than 
under other regimes. Country B always has the option of removing tariffs unilaterally on its own 
or within an FTA. Therefore, if country B benefits more from an open regionalism agreement, 
it must be due to the fact that the other participants to the agreement also remove tariffs 
on imports from non-participating economies. In general, tariffs affect welfare levels thorough 
changes in world prices and through the revenues tariffs generate. In this case, any increase in 
welfare must be due to a change in the price of goods since economies A and B are removing all 
of their tariffs and therefore have no tariffs revenues. In terms of international prices of goods, 
economy B gains from a fall in the price of the imports, goods 1 and 3, and loses out from a fall 
in the price of its export, good 2. The commitment by countries A and B to remove tariffs on 
imports from country C is likely to make country C to set higher tariffs, which would have the 
effect of depressing the prices of good 1 and good 2. The welfare of country B could increase 
if the loss of welfare from the fall in the price of good 2 is smaller than the benefits from the 
fall in price of good 1. In effect, country B is receiving the benefits of the externality effect due 
to the country C's increased tariffs on imports from country A. Open regionalism agreement 
prevents country A from retaliating to country C and in a sense helps country C win a "trade 
war" over country A. 
Thus, if the two countries in an open regionalism agreement are not symmetric, one of them 
could gain at the expense of another. Numerical simulations demonstrate that such an situation 
could indeed arise. The next question is whether open regionalism agreement could ever be an 
equilibrium. Each country has the right not to participate in any trade agreements. If an policy 
of open regionalism policy is welfare-worsening, then why should country A agree to such an 
arrangement? It turns out that in some situations, open regionalism is the least worst outcome 
for country A and hence country A will choose to join in an open regionalism agreement to 
avoid even worse outcomes being realised. 
A PTA consisting of countries B and C is likely to be welfare-worsening for country A. 
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If countries B and C form free trade area, the consumers in those countries substitute away 
from the export of country A to the import from the PTA partner. Moreover, countries B 
and C may form a customs union which tends to be more aggressive in setting external tariffs. 
Therefore, country A would opt for an open regionalism agreement with country B if doing so 
is less welfare-worsening than letting economies B and C form a PTA. Country B on the other 
hand might agree to such an arrangement, if it can obtain a better welfare level by choosing 
country A as its partner rather than country C. The loss of welfare incurred to country A as 
a result of agreeing to open regionalism can be seen as a retainer country A has to offer to 
country B in order to avoid a greater loss. 
Moreover, it is possible that country B obtains a greater welfare level under an open re- 
gionalism agreement with country A than under global free trade. Since economy C is free to 
levy any tariffs without the fear of retaliation, it is also likely to obtain relatively high level of 
welfare. If one country in the trade agreement (i. e. country B) and the country outside (i. e. 
country C) find open regionalism better than free trade, there is little incentives in the system 
to pursue multilateral trade liberalization. Hence, open regionalism could be an obstacle to 
achieving the goal of global free trade. 
Thus, the mechanism by which open regionalism agreement could arise is rather simple. 
However, showing the result is analytically is not possible. Therefore, I will use numerical 
simulations in the following sections to demonstrate the effects of an open regionalism agreement 
on welfare and that it can be an equilibrium outcome. 
4.3 The Model 
In this section, I will describe the model and the methodology used for the numerical simulations. 
A pure exchange economy consisting of n countries and m types of goods are used for the 
numerical simulations. The subscript i (i = A, B, C,... ) is used to index the countries and 
the subscript j (j = 1,2,3,... ) is used for the types of goods. Let X2j denote the aggregate 
consumption of good j in country i. Preferences for the representative consumer in country i 
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are described by the utility function, 
0" fm 
1 Q-1 
Ui = 
', 
QZjxi; 
j=1 
where 
m1 
23 = 
1, (4.2) 
j=1 
and Q denotes the elasticity of substitution. Let pj denotes the world price of good 3'. Aggregate 
demand, Xis, can be written as 
where 
xii = Ui 
ß2j 
piu (4.3) [pj (1 + tip)] 
1 
Im 1-a 
Piu = 
Eoijlpj(1 +tij)(4.4) 
j=1 
The representative consumer in economy i is endowed with w2j units of good j. The revenue 
from tariffs is returned to the consumer. The aggregate income for the consumer in economy i, 
Mi, is therefore given by 
m 
mz =E (W jjpjj + xis t27pz7) 
(4-5) 
and the budget constraint is given by 
Mi = uipiu. (4.6) 
Finally, the aggregate supply of goods must be equal to aggregate demand in equilibrium; 
n 
i 
(4.7) 
Using this model, I will examine five types of trade agreements, which are No Agreement, 
Customs Union, Free Trade Area, Open Regionalism and Global Free Trade. These trade 
arrangements are defined as follows. 
In the No Agreement case, each country individually sets tariffs rates on imports to maximize 
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its own welfare taking the tariffs rates of trading partners as given. Thus, this is a Nash 
equilibrium with no cooperation between any of the economies. In the case of CU, the countries 
which participate in the customs union will remove the tariffs on imports from other member 
countries in the union. Common external tariffs rates are levied on imports from non-member 
countries. The rates are set to maximize the simple sum of the utility levels of the member 
countries given in (4.1). The use of the simple sum is justified since identical utility functions 
are used for all countries. In the case of FTA, tariffs on the imports from member countries 
are removed as in the case of CU. However, each country sets its tariffs rates on imports from 
non-member to maximize its own welfare. If a policy of open regionalism is adopted, then 
the participating countries agree to remove all tariffs. Only the non-participating countries set 
tariffs. In the case of global free trade, all the tariffs in the system are removed. 
The methods of the simulations corresponding to each of the trade agreements are as follows. 
In the No Agreement case, the tariffs rates of country A, t1j, are chosen to maximize the utility 
of country A while the tariffs rates levied by other countries are held constant. Then the utility 
of country B, C,... up to country n is sequentially maximised in the same way. This procedure 
is iterated until a Nash equilibrium in tariffs rates is found. The same procedure is applied for 
the case of FTA except that tariffs rates for imports from other member countries are always 
set at zero in the iterative procedure. In the case of a customs union, joint utility is maximised 
by varying the common tariffs rates on imports from non-member countries. 6 In the open 
regionalism case, member countries set all the tariff rates at zero and only non-member country 
imposes tariffs to maximize its utility. 
4.4 Can open regionalism dominate free trade? 
When discussing the possible trade arrangements, it needs to be noted that the possibility 
of transfer payments between countries are ruled out. This assumption is necessary for the 
following reason. In the absence of externalities or distortions other than tariffs, the aggregate 
welfare is maximised under global free trade. Suppose that countries in the system liberalise 
6Other studies take a different approach. Riezman (1999), for example, computes two equilibria for the 
external tariff set by a customs union of two countries. Each equilibrium is obtained by maximizing the utility 
of one of the two countries. It is assumed that the customs union chooses an external tariff rate which gives each 
country the average of these two equilibrium utility levels. 
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Table 4.2: The possible coalitional arrangements 
n Coalitional Arrangement Trade Policy 
1 {A} {B} {C} No Agreement 
2 {A, B} {C} CU between A and B 
3 {A, B} {C} FTA between A and B 
4 {A, B} {C} OR between A and B 
5 {A} {B, C} CU between B and C 
6 {A} {B, C} FTA between B and C 
7 {A} {B, C} OR between B and C 
8 {A, C} {B} CU between A and C 
9 {A, C} {B} FTA between A and C 
10 {A, C} {B} OR between A and C 
11 {A, B, C} Global Free Trade 
trade completely. Then it is always possible to find a set of transfer payments which makes 
all countries better off than they would be under other trading arrangements. Furthermore, 
this pattern of transfer payments can be replicated by a set of tariffs. If transfer payments and 
equivalent tariffs measures are not ruled out, the countries will always agree to these measures. 
Hence, the studies on regional trade agreements presuppose that such transfer agreements are 
not possible and we will do so in this study as well. 
The policy coordination considered in this study are customs union, free trade area, open 
regionalism agreement and global free trade. In a scenario with three countries, there are eleven 
possible coalitional arrangements. These combinations are shown in Table 4.2. Countries in 
the bracket {} are in the same coalition. 
Arrangement 1 is the case in which there are no agreements and each country sets tariffs 
to maximize its own welfare. In arrangement 2,3 and 4 countries A and B are in a coalition 
and country C remains outside. In arrangement 5,6 and 7, countries B and C form a coalition 
leaving country A out. Similar trade arrangements are possible between countries A and C 
which leaves country B as shown in arrangement 8,9 and 10. Finally, arrangement 11 is the 
case in which there are not restrictions to trade. 
We can obtain the welfare levels of the countries under different trading arrangements using 
numerical simulations described in the previous section. Given the possible outcomes, we can 
determine which trading arrangement will actually be implemented using the concept of the 
"core" as in Riezrnan (1985). 
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It is possible to obtain a set of equilibrium goods allocation for each of coalitional arrange- 
ment. This equilibrium allocation of goods gives the welfare levels for each economy associ- 
ated with different arrangements. Given these welfare levels, we may deduce which coalitional 
arrangement will result as an equilibrium trade agreement. A coalitional arrangement is blocked 
if there is another arrangement which results in the allocation that makes the countries in the 
coalition no worse off and some of them better off. For example, No Agreement blocks Global 
Free Trade if any one of the three countries obtains a higher welfare level under No Agreement 
than under Global Free Trade. Similarly, coalitional arrangement 1 (i. e. a customs union be- 
tween A and B) would block No Agreement if both countries A and B could obtain a higher 
welfare level in the customs union than under No Agreement. A trading arrangement is in 
the core if it is unblocked by any other possible arrangement. When there is more than one 
arrangement in the core, the theory offers no prediction as to which arrangement will be the 
actual outcome. It is possible that any one of the arrangements in the core turns out to be the 
actual outcome. Numerical examples in this study show that open regionalism could be in the 
core along with other arrangements. 
Finally, I will assume that there are restrictions to the possible coalitional combinations. 
Riezman (1985) considers the effects of banning bilateral trade agreements, which means that 
some of the coalitional arrangement are ruled out. In this study, I will introduce a different kind 
of restrictions. Rather than restricting the forms of trade policy coordination, I will restrict the 
possible combination of countries. For example, if the policy coordination between countries A 
and C is ruled out, then coalitional arrangements 8,9 and 10 are taken out of the consideration. 
This restriction may seem arbitrary but it is not hard to imagine that some countries are not 
able to form a trade bloc together due to political, cultural and historical reasons. For example, 
the geographical proximity and the vast differences in relative factor endowments mean that 
there are large potential gains in the trade between Japan and Russia. However, political 
considerations make it very unlikely that the two countries agree to a bilateral preferential trade 
agreement. The North and the South Korea are another example. Similarly, it is implausible 
that the United States and any of the countries it calls "terrorist states" come together to form 
a preferential trade agreement. 
The numerical examples carried out in the following section shows that when there are 
93 
restrictions on possible coalitional arrangements, it is often the case that open regionalism 
agreement is in the core.? 
In what follows, four simulation exercises are carried out. The first is carried out to illustrate 
the point that when two countries form a PTA, optimal tariffs on imports from the outside 
country may become lower. However, this does not mean that these countries adopt a policy 
of open regionalism. The second simulation shows a simple example in which a PTA between 
asymmetric countries may lead to adopting open regionalism. The third and fourth examples 
show that an country may participate in an open regionalism agreement to avoid formation of 
a PTA that excludes it. This means that one country may have to accept a welfare-worsening 
open regionalism agreement. 
Simulation 1 
This simulation shows an example in which the formation of a CU results in a lower external 
tariffs rate than in the case of No Agreement. The tariff lowering effect of a PTA is pointed 
out in Syropoulos (1999). In general, a formation of a customs union and the introduction of 
the common external tariffs give the customs union a greater market power. Moreover, the 
benefits of the lower price as a result of levying tariffs by one country are internalised in the 
union. Therefore, when countries form a customs union, the common external tariffs tend to 
be higher than a pre-union tariffs rates of member countries. However, formation of a customs 
union could result in lowering the tariffs for the following reasons. 
In this simulation, countries A and B form a customs union and set a common external 
tariff on good 3 which is the good imported from country C. Before the formation of the union, 
country A's tariffs on imports from country C has the effect of increasing the revenue from 
tariffs on imports from country B. Since goods are assumed to be substitutes for one another, 
a higher price of good 3 results in greater demand for good 2, which is imported from country 
B. With the formation of a customs union, this revenue increasing effect of tariffs disappears. 
Therefore, the formation of a customs union by A and B removes one incentives for imposing 
higher tariffs on imports from country C. 
7One disadvantage of relying on numerical simulations is that we cannot say for sure if such restrictions are 
necessary for open regionalism agreement to be in the core. There may be a pattern of factor endowments which 
leave open regionalism in the core without any restrictions imposed. 
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Table 4.3: Simulation 1 
The endowments 
Country 
A 
B 
C 
1 
3.0 
0 
1.0 
2 
0 
3.0 
1.0 
3 
1.0 
1.0 
3.0 
Eq. Country Utility Tariffs Prices Consumption Trade 
A 1.307 0 0.547 0.407 1.000 1.929 0.806 1.306 1.071 -0.806 -0.306 
NA B 1.307 0.547 0 0.407 1.000 0.806 1.929 1.306 -0.806 1.071 -0.306 
C 1.600 0.187 0.187 0 0.864 1.264 1.264 2.388 -0.264 -0.264 -0.612 
A 1.348 0 0 0.237 1.000 1.380 1.380 1.285 1.620 -1.380 -0.285 
CU B 1.348 0 0 0.237 1.000 1.380 1.380 1.285 -1.380 1.620 -0.285 
C 1.592 0.174 0.174 0 0.838 1.239 1.239 2.430 -0.239 -0.239 -0.570 
A 1.343 0 0 0.083 1.000 1.340 1.340 1.348 1.660 -1.340 -0.348 
FTA B 1.343 0 0 0.083 1.000 1.340 1.340 1.348 -1.340 1.660 -0.348 
C 1.618 0.217 0.217 0 0.921 1.320 1.320 2.305 -0.320 -0.320 0.695 
A 1.336 0 0 0 1.000 1.313 1.313 1.383 1.687 -1.313 -0.383 
OR B 1.336 0 0 0 1.000 1.313 1.313 1.383 -1.313 1.687 -0.383 
C 1.637 0.243 0.243 0 0.975 1.373 1.373 2.234 -0.373 -0.373 0.766 
A 1.349 0 0 0 1.000 1.249 1.249 1.561 1.751 -1.249 -0.561 
GFT B 1.349 0 0 0 1.000 1.249 1.249 1.561 -1.249 1.751 -0.561 
C 1.623 0 0 0 0.894 1.502 1.502 1.877 -0.502 -0.502 1.123 
The price in the row for country A corresponds to the price for good 1 and similarly row B is for goods 2 
and row C is for good 3. 
95 
In term of welfare, the following takes place. Suppose, for the purpose of illustration, that 
the tariffs rate on the imports from country C is fixed at the pre-union level. In country A, trade 
liberalization with country B makes the price of the imported good from country B cheaper 
than the imports from country C. Since different types of goods are substitutes for one another, 
country A imports more from country B and less from country C. Expansion of import from 
country B must be balanced by the expansion of exports to country B. Suppose that the pre- 
union tariffs rate of country A on imports from country B is relative high while the tariffs on 
imports from country B is low so that the internal price of imports from C is already relatively 
high comparted to the imports from country B. In this case, the scope for substitution from 
imports from country C to imports from country B as a result of trade liberalization may be 
little. As a consequence, country A gains little from trade creation while it loses tariffs revenues. 
Therefore, formation of a PTA removes tariffs revenue while exacerbating the loss from trade 
diversion which results from the tariffs on the imports from country C. If countries A and B 
lower the tariffs from country C, the negative effects from trade diversion can be made smaller 
and could result in overall welfare gains. This argument equally applies to the case of free 
trade area. Since the formation of free trade are does not does not give the member economy a 
greater market power or internalise the externality, it is more likely that the member countries 
of a FTA reduces the external tariffs rate. 
The results of simulations show that when countries A and B form a customs union or free 
trade association, these countries lower tariffs on imports from the third country compared with 
the No Agreement case. The external tariffs rate is higher in case of CU than FTA. This is due 
to the fact that in the case of FTA, the benefits of tariffs shared by the FTA partner is not 
regarded as internal. 
It is noted that the countries A and B lose when they move to OR from CU or FTA. As 
discussed in Johnson (1954), countries will impose tariffs on imports unless the offer curve of 
the trading partners is a straight line. In this case, if the countries do adopt the policy of open 
regionalism, they are making unilateral concessions to country C. 
Simulation 2 
This simulation is an example in which one member country prefers open regionalism to 
PTA. This is due to the fact that the patterns of endowments between the potential PTA 
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partners are such that one of them is the symmetric to the outside economy. 
As before, there are three countries in this example. To illustrate the point in a simplest way, 
I will assume that trade policy coordination is possible only between country A and country 
B. Then there are five possible coalitional arrangements in this example; No Agreement, CU 
between A and B, FTA between A and B, Open Regionalism between A and B and Global 
Free Trade. All other arrangements are ruled out. 
The numerical simulations show that OR between countries A and B gives country B the 
highest welfare level of all the possible outcomes. The result is trivial since country B does 
not trade with country C. Therefore, having no tariffs on imports from country C does not 
harm country B at all. However, country B does gain from the removal of tariffs its trade bloc 
partner, country A, levies on imports from country C for the following reason. If country A 
joins in an open regionalism agreement, country C sets tariffs rate on imports from country 
A more aggressively. This has the effect of depressing the price of the export from country A 
which is imported not only by country C but also by country B. 
We can deduce from the utility levels associated with the coalitional arrangements that 
No Agreement is blocked by OR as both countries A and B are better off with OR than No 
Agreement. Country B finds No Agreement preferable to CU and therefore CU is also blocked. 
Therefore, open regionalism agreement and FTA are the outcomes in the core. Country A 
prefers FTA but country B prefers open regionalism. We cannot say which trade arrangement 
will be the actual outcome but open regionalism is clearly a possibility. The country B's utility 
level obtained in the case of OR is greater then the level it can achieve under global free trade. 
The outside country, country C, is also better off under open regionalism of countries A and 
B than with the global free trade. Therefore, once countries A and B sign up to an open 
regionalism agreement, two countries in the system have little incentive to move to global free 
trade. Therefore, open regionalism in this case may prove to be an obstacle to the multilateral 
trade liberalization process. 
Simulation 3 
In this example, the possibility that smaller countries use the threat of forming a trade bloc 
of their own will force another large country to sing up to an open regionalism agreement. 
There are four countries in the system and they are labelled as A, B, C and D. There are 
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Table 4.4: Simulation 2 
The endowments 
1 2 3 
A 3.0 0 0 
Country B 1.0 4.0 3.0 
C 1.0 3.0 4.0 
Eq. Country Utility Tariffs Prices Consumption Trade 
A 1.022 0 0.374 0.374 1.000 1.406 0.853 0.853 1.594 -0.853 -0.853 
NA B 2.607 0.268 0 0.080 0.934 1.797 3.310 2.836 -0.797 0.690 0.164 
C 2.607 0.268 0.080 0 0.934 1.797 2.836 3.310 -0.797 0.164 0.690 
A 1.103 0 0 0.154 1.000 0.991 1.265 1.063 2.009 -1.265 -1.063 
CU B 2.593 0 0 0.154 0.855 2.328 2.973 2.498 -1.328 1.027 0.502 
C 2.573 0.197 0.055 0 0.837 1.681 2.762 3.439 -0.681 0.238 0.561 
A 1.075 0 0 0.144 1.000 1.009 1.281 0.948 1.991 -1.281 -0.948 
FTA B 2.608 0 0 0 0.887 2.241 2.874 2.758 -1.241 1.153 0.242 
C 2.595 0.237 0.088 0 0.902 1.750 2.872 3.294 -0.750 0.128 0.706 
A 1.069 0 0 0 1.000 0.935 1.188 1.093 2.065 -1.188 -1.093 
OR B 2.611 0 0 0 0.887 2.283 2.901 2.667 -1.283 1.099 0.333 
C 2.604 0.248 0.100 0 0.925 1.782 2.911 3.240 -0.782 0.089 0.760 
A 1.122 0 0 0 1.000 0.891 1.248 1.248 2.109 -1.248 -0.248 
GFT B 2.587 0 0 0 0.845 2.054 2.876 2.876 -1.054 1.124 0.124 
C 2.587 0 0 0 0.845 2.054 2.876 2.876 -0.502 0.124 1.124 
The price in the row for country A corresponds to the price for good 1 and similarly row B is for goods 2 
and row C is for good 3. 
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restrictions in the possible coalitional arrangements and only five coalitional arrangements are 
possible; No Agreement, CU between countries A and B, CU between countries A, B and C, 
Open Regionalism between countries A, B and C and finally Global Free Trade. As shown in 
Table 4.5, if three countries were to form a larger customs union, it would give all the three 
countries higher welfare levels than in the case of the smaller union between A and B or under 
No Agreement. Therefore, the large customs union blocks No Agreement and the small customs 
union. However, the welfare levels of countries A and B will be higher still if the three countries 
agree to adopt open regionalism policy. It is evident that this higher welfare level is achieved 
at the expense of country C. In this case, therefore, OR and the large CU are in the core. 
Is the outcome of OR possible? The negotiating strategy of countries A and B would be to 
offer country C two alternative; OR among the three countries or else they will form a small 
customs union between the two countries. The threat to form a small customs union may not 
appear to be credible since countries A and B would obtain lower welfare levels than in the 
case of a customs union consisting of three countries. However, if the small customs union is 
formed, country C loses out considerably. The welfare of country C becomes worse than it is 
under No Agreement. Thus, to avoid the small customs union being formed, country C may 
agree to open regionalism policy with countries A and B. Open regionalism agreement between 
countries A, B and C give the highest welfare levels not only to countries A and B but also 
country D which is not involved in trade bloc formation proposals at all. Therefore, although 
the utility level of country C is highest under global free trade, other three economies do not 
have incentives to negotiate further if the three economies adopt open regionalism policy. 
Simulation 4 
In this example, one country forces its trade partner to accept a welfare-worsening open 
regionalism agreement by the use of threat to form an alternative PTA with an outside country. 
There are three asymmetric countries labeled as A, B and C. It is assumed that two larger 
countries, A and C, are unable to form a trade bloc for political or other reasons. The smallest 
country, B, may form a PTA with one of the larger countries. Country A is relatively large 
and achieves a high welfare level in the case of No 
Agreement. For country B, No Agreement 
gives the lowest utility but its trading partner, country A has no incentives to form a PTA with 
country B. Both CU and FTA consisting of countries 
A and B give a lower utility level for 
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Table 4.5: Simulation 3 
The endowments 
1 2 3 4 
A 4.0 1.0 0 4.0 
Country B 1.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 
C 1.0 3.0 4.0 2.0 
D 4.0 4.0 4.0 10.0 
Eq. Country Utility Tariffs Prices Consumption 
A 2.803 0 0.501 0.508 0.325 1.000 2.523 1.822 3.548 3.965 
NA B 2.803 0.501 0 0.508 0.325 1.000 1.822 2.523 3.548 3.965 
C 2.868 1.233 1.233 0 1.227 0.433 1.808 1.808 6.716 3.567 
D 5.209 0.155 0.155 0.473 0 0.429 3.847 3.847 6.188 8.503 
A 2.839 0 0 0.499 0.141 1.000 2.225 2.225 3.384 4.007 
CU B 2.839 0 0 0.499 0.141 1.000 2.973 2.498 3.384 4.007 
{A, B} C 2.777 0.189 0.189 0 1.189 0.395 1.725 1.725 6.787 3.451 
D 5.248 0.146 0.146 0.521 0 0.420 3.825 3.825 6.444 8.534 
A 2.870 0 0 0 0.261 1.000 2.007 2.007 4.472 3.733 
CU B 2.870 0 0 0 0.261 1.000 2.007 2.007 4.472 3.733 
{A, B, Cl C 2.899 0 0 0 0.261 0.383 2.097 2.097 4.516 3.770 
D 5.239 0.101 0.101 0.433 0.381 0.381 3.749 3.749 6.539 8.763 
1 2.879 0 0 0 0 1.000 2.057 2.057 4.434 3.900 
OR 2 2.879 0 0 0 0 1.000 2.057 2.057 4.434 3.900 
3 2.852 0 0 0 0 0.383 2.037 2.037 4.392 3.864 
4 5.294 0.180 0.180 0.531 0 0.449 3.850 3.850 6.739 8.335 
A 2.847 0 0 0 0 1.000 2.043 2.043 4.086 4.086 
GFT B 2.847 0 0 0 0 1.000 2.043 2.043 4.086 4.086 
C 2.984 0 0 0 0 0.420 2.142 2.142 4.284 4.284 
D 5.254 0 0 0 0 0.420 3.722 3.722 7.543 7.543 
CU{A, B} refers to the customs union between economy A and B. CU{A, B, Cl refers to the customs union 
between economy A, B and C. 
100 
country A. However, if countries B and C were to form a customs union, the welfare of country 
A decreases considerably. This threat to form a customs union between countries B and C is 
credible because both of these countries obtain a higher utility level in the union than in the 
No Agreement case. Given such a threat, country A has the incentive to form a trade bloc 
with country B. Even though such an arrangement would decrease the utility level of country 
A, it would still be better off than being left out of a customs union between countries B and 
C. If countries A and B were to form a CU or an FTA or adopt open regionalism policy, the 
welfare of country B will be higher than the case of No Agreement or CU between B and C. 
Therefore, country B will choose to form a trade bloc with country A. 
It is evident that No Agreement and FTA between countries B and C are blocked by CU 
between B and C. A customs union between B and C is in turn blocked by CU, FTA or OR 
between countries A and B. Hence, the three possible forms of trade bloc between countries A 
and B and Global Free Trade are in the core. 
The preferences for country A would be Global Free Trade, CU, FTA then Open Regionalism 
in the descending order. For country B, the order of preferences are Open Regionalism, FTA, 
Global Free Trade then CU. If the outcome is Open Regionalism, then countries B and C both 
prefer Open Regionalism to Global Free Trade. Hence if open regionalism is adopted, it could 
prove to be an obstacle to multilateral liberalization in this case also. 
Country B obtains a higher welfare level under Open Regionalism than under FTA or CU 
with country A for the two reasons. First, the price of its export, good 2, relative to the price 
of good 1 increases and this will benefit country B. Unlike Simulation 2, country B is the 
exporter of good B to country C also. It is noted that although country B gives up the welfare 
improving retaliatory tariffs on imports from country C, it still ends up with a higher welfare 
level. Secondly, country B is an importer of good 3 under FTA but the trade pattern changes 
under Open Regionalism and it becomes an exporter of good 3 as well. Together with the 
higher price of good 3, this change also benefits country B. Although it is not shown in this 
example, the increase in the price in the price of good 2 relative to the price of good 1 alone 
should be enough to have a situation in which country B does better under OR than under 
PTAs. 
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Table 4.6: Simulation 4 
The endowments 
1 2 3 
A 14.0 4.0 3.0 
Country B 1.0 8.0 5.0 
C 1.0 6.0 13.0 
Eq. Country Utility Tariffs Prices Consumption Trade 
A 7.264 0 0.619 0.662 1.000 10.014 5.946 6.163 3.986 -1.946 -3.163 NA B 4.418 0.182 0 0.102 0.802 2.651 5.763 5.187 -1.651 2.237 -0.187 C 6.152 0.304 0.185 0 0.767 3.335 6.291 9.651 -2.335 -0.291 3.349 
Cu A 6.984 0 0.534 0.596 1.000 10.539 5.218 5.749 3.461 -1.218 -2.749 {2,3} B 4.481 0.418 0 0 0.927 2.285 5.349 6.381 -1.285 2.651 -1.381 C 6.228 0.418 0 0 0.848 3.176 7.434 8.869 -2.176 -1.434 4.131 
FTA A 7.289 0 0.610 0.676 1.000 10.000 5.798 6.398 4.000 -1.798 -3.398 {2,3} B 4.449 0.122 0 0 0.927 2.661 5.031 6.020 -1.661 2.969 -1.020 C 6.142 0.195 0 0 0.848 3.339 7.171 8.582 -2.339 -1.171 4.418 
Cu A 7.262 0 0 0.317 1.000 7.412 7.736 6.660 6.588 -3.736 -3.660 {1,2} B 4.588 0.317 0.979 4.682 4.887 4.207 -3.682 3.113 0.793 C 6.214 0.290 0.124 0 0.801 3.906 5.377 10.133 -2.906 0.623 2.867 
FTA A 7.112 0 0 0.223 1.000 7.471 7.731 6.185 6.529 -3.731 -3.185 {1,2} B 4.646 0 0 0.004 0.983 4.280 4.429 5.255 -3.280 3.571 -0.225 C 6.367 0.348 0.169 0 0.899 4.249 5.840 9.560 -3.249 0.160 3.440 
OR A 7.043 0 0 0 1.000 6.877 7.098 7.156 7.123 -3.098 -4.156 {1,2} B 4.647 0 0 0 0.984 4.538 4.683 4.722 -3.538 3.317 0.278 
C 6.512 0.383 0.206 0 0.980 4.585 6.219 9.123 -3.585 -0.219 3.877 
A 7.264 0 0 0 1.000 6.359 7.154 8.347 7.641 -3.154 -5.347 GFT B 4.598 0 0 0 0.943 4.025 4.529 5.283 -3.025 3.471 -0.283 
C 6.414 0 0 0 0.873 5.615 6.317 7.370 -4.615 -0.317 5.630 
The price in the row for country A corresponds to the price for good 1 and similarly row B is for goods 2 
and row C is for good 3. 
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4.5 Concluding remarks 
The two main objections to PTAs are that it creates trade diversion and may also reduce 
incentives for the member countries to take part in further multilateral trade liberalisation. If 
a trade bloc adopts the policy of open regionalism, it will avoid creating trade diversion since 
the policy is non-discriminatory. Moreover, the commonly held view in the literature is that 
although open regionalism may reduce incentives for non-member countries to liberalise trade, 
this is not a problem for countries in the trade bloc. When this is the case, open regionalism 
can be seen as a collective action to mitigate the loss from unilateral reduction in tariffs. 
However, the findings in this study show that there are situations in which open region- 
alism could actually benefit some member countries in the bloc at the expense of the other 
members. In effect, these countries benefits from restricting the tariff imposing power of its 
trading partners in the bloc. This is due to the external effect of the tariffs imposed by the 
non-member countries. The results of numerical simulations suggest that it may become even 
harder to pursue further multilateral trade liberalization. 
This finding is in sharp contrast with the commonly held view in the literature. The 
skepticism in the literature about the proposed open regionalism policy is usually that although 
the term "open regionalism" is used, the actual policy proposal in fact involves discriminatory 
practice. This study shows that even if the policy proposal is unconditional MFN to the letters, 
it may still have adverse effects. 
An obvious question to ask is how likely it is that open regionalism becomes obstacle to 
the process of multilateral trade liberalisation. One possible way to answer this question is to 
carry out simulations varying the set of endowments in a systematic manner. Then one could 
obtain the likelihood of open regionalism being left in the core. However, I am skeptical about 
the value of such an exercise. The model used for numerical simulations is a very simple one. 
It is doubtful that the quality of debate on the merits of open regionalism is raised by finding 
the likelihood of open regionalism being in the core in this simple framework. 
A similar point can be made with regard to the assumptions made while carrying out 
simulations. All examples considered in this study assume asymmetry and restrictions for the 
possible coalitional arrangements. In the real world, these 
factors are the norm rather than 
exceptions and therefore the situation described in this study may well arise. However, it is 
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meaningless to discuss how likely the real world situation agrees with these assumption. 
All this type of study can hope to achieve is to demonstrate and confirm that open regional- 
ism may prove to be an obstacle to the goal achieving global free trade. Hence, when the policy 
makers contemplate adopting an element of unconditional MFN in a regional trade agreement, 
the possible adverse effects pointed out in this study should be considered. If we were to exam- 
ine the relevance of this problem to the real policy debate, it would require reasonably detailed 
applied general equilibrium model. This is beyond a scope of this study. 
Finally, it needs to be noted that there are other reasons for which some countries could 
pursue open regionalism policy to serve their self-interest. One possibility is that the exported 
goods from the countries in an open regionalism agreement are complements. Consider the 
following situation. There are three countries labelled A, B and C. Countries A and B form 
a free trade area. Suppose that the consumers' demand in country C is such that the exports 
from countries A and B are complements. Hence, a rise in country C's demand for the good 
imported from country A is accompanied by a rise in demand for the good imported from 
country B and vice versa. If the volume of trade between countries A and C is reduced as a 
result of a tariff war between these two countries, country B's export to country C is also likely 
to suffer. If country C consume the export from country A less, then it is likely that the export 
of country B is consumed less due to the complementarity of these two goods. Therefore, the 
interest of country B may be best served by an increased volume of trade between countries 
A and C. It is possible that the volume of trade between countries A and C is greater when 
country A is constrained from levying any tariffs under open regionalism agreement than when 
it imposes tariffs as allowed by a free trade area agreement. In this case, country B would want 
to pursue open regionalism. Detailed analysis of this possibility is left for future work. 
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Chapter 5 
Comments on Policy Implications 
Persistent disparity in income levels across countries has led to the argument that poorer coun- 
tries ought to be given help in adopting advanced technology. The findings that technological 
progress in East Asian economies has been modest is interpreted by some authors as supporting 
this view of technology. Theoretically, this view has found an expression in the form of models 
of innovation. 
In models of innovation, devoting more resources to the innovation activities promote 
growth. An implication of this is that protection of such "innovative sectors" is necessary 
in order for less developed countries to raise their living standards. It is in this context that 
the findings in this thesis have relevance to the policy debate. 
This thesis suggests that one cannot read too much into the finding that TFP growth in 
East Asian economies has been slow. It is noted that there are a number difficulties with 
measuring TFP residuals in a meaningful manner. Increasing importance of trade in capital 
goods and foreign direct investment makes the task even harder. If we were to measure the 
extent of technological progress as intended by Solow accurately, we would have to deal with 
issues such as transfer pricing, embodiment of technology in imported capital goods, varying 
retirement rates of capital among others. 
The three-sector AK model in this thesis demonstrates that the observed pattern of factor 
prices can be explained while assuming that technology is a public-good. Two conclusions may 
be drawn. First, it is by no means clear that technology is the cause of North-South disparity. 
Second, even if poor countries had exactly the same technological level as the industrialised 
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countries, the return on investment in those countries might not be as 
high as suggested by 
some models. Thus, we should not necessarily expect convergence. Convergence could take 
place, however, in those poorer countries that have a higher saving rate and a favourable terms 
of trade with richer countries. 
It would surely be absurd to suggest that poorer countries should spend a large share of its 
resources on R&D activities in order to catch up with richer countries. If we accept the public- 
good model of technology, justification for protecting the so-called high-tech sectors becomes 
much weaker. On the contrary, this study suggests that trade barriers especially those against 
imports of capital goods would have negative effects on growth as confirmed by a number of 
empirical studies. The model implies that having a higher savings rate and a lower rate of the 
population growth is the key to raising the living standard in poorer countries. Incidentally, 
these two issues are not unrelated. Studies suggest that falling birth rates tend to raise the 
savings rate. ' Furthermore, although it is not addressed in the model, allocative efficiency is 
likely to play an important role. These "traditional" policy agenda that have been discussed in 
the context of the neoclassical model remain important. 
In recent years, the issue of protecting intellectual property rights has received a high 
profile in the trade policy debate. The firms in industrialised countries, most notably the 
pharmaceutical companies, have sought to protect their monopoly power that international 
patent rights would allow. Protection of patent rights has become an important international 
trade issue because it is evidently quite easy to imitate the advanced technology in developing 
countries. It seems therefore that where the yields are high enough, adoption of technology is 
not such a problem for developing countries. 
Although 1 have argued against laying too much emphasis on the role of technology in 
accounting for North-South inequality, technology is, of course, very important especially at 
micro-levels. International dissemination of knowledge should take place relatively easily, but 
there may be instances where assisting this process yields good returns. Moreover, the geogra- 
phy and climate of poorer countries may present technological challenges that cannot be met 
by the existing technology. In such cases, one could imagine that the technological resources in 
industrialised countries can usefully deployed for finding new solutions. 
'For a discussion of this issue, see Higgins and Williamson 
(1996). 
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In terms of trade policy, these studies confirm the importance of "getting the basics right" . 
In order to narrow North-South inequality, trade liberalisation in the North as well as the South 
is important. In practice, this would mean that the industrialised countries need to liberalise its 
agricultural markets and perhaps more importantly, the developing countries should liberalise 
trade in manufactured goods, especially capital goods. 
Moreover, this study also emphasise the importance of multilateral trade liberalisation. 
Open regionalism policy may appear to be innovative at first sight. However, although it is 
non-discriminatory and does not involve those much discussed problems with regional trade 
agreements, it may still hinder the multilateral trade liberalisation towards global free trade. 
If policy makers are wary of such a proposal, the findings in this thesis suggest that they are 
right to be so. 
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